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OHIO’S MODERN 
COURTS AMENDMENT MUST BE 
AMENDED: WHY AND HOW*
RICHARD S. WALINSKI** & MARK D. WAGONER, JR.***
ABSTRACT
A 1968 amendment to the Ohio Constitution granted the Supreme Court of Ohio 
the authority to promulgate “rules governing practice and procedure” for Ohio courts. 
The amendment also provided that “[a]ll laws in conflict with such rules shall be of 
no further force or effect after such rules have taken effect” and that no rule may 
“abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive right.” 
Although the amendment was explicit about automatic repeal of existing laws, it 
says nothing about whether the General Assembly may legislate on a procedural 
matter after a court rule takes effect. That silence has caused enduring confusion. Since 
1968, the Supreme Court of Ohio has considered dozens of cases in which a court-
promulgated rule appears to conflict with a subsequently enacted statute. 
The court has reached two views on whether later-enacted statutes that conflict 
with existing court rules are constitutional. One holds that, because the constitution 
grants rulemaking authority exclusively to the court, the General Assembly has no 
authority once the court promulgates a procedural rule. It has also held the opposite: 
the General Assembly may legislate on a procedural matter already addressed in a 
court rule if the legislature intends to remake that “matter of practice or procedure” 
into a “substantive right.” 
These contradictory interpretations cannot both be right. Yet each remains 
controlling precedent in Ohio.
Neither of the court’s contradictory rulings rests on a cogent textual analysis of the 
1968 amendment. This failing, however, is no reflection on the court. A definitive 
resolution of the conflicting interpretations is impossible because the sparse language 
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of the amendment simply does not contain enough textual foundation from which to 
derive a compelling, permanent answer—one way or the other. 
The authors propose an amendment that would add language to the 1968 
amendment. By providing a textual basis for the court’s second interpretive ruling, it 
would make clear and permanent the legislature’s authority to share in the process of 
forming court rules. It would align Ohio’s rulemaking process with Congress’s 
participation in rulemaking for federal courts and with the large majority of states that 
preserve for their legislatures at least some participation in forming the content of rules 
of practice and procedure.
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I.    INTRODUCTION
A void has existed in the Ohio Constitution since adoption of the Modern Courts 
Amendment in 1968. It exists in what is now Art. IV, § 5(B). This provision gives the 
Supreme Court of Ohio the power to promulgate “rules governing practice and procedure” 
in all Ohio courts.1 This authority previously resided in the General Assembly under Art. 
                                                          
1 OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 5(B) (“The Supreme Court shall prescribe rules governing practice and 
procedure in all courts of the state, which rules shall not abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive 
right. Proposed rules shall be filed by the court, not later than the fifteenth day of January, with the clerk 
of each house of the General Assembly during a regular session thereof, and amendments to any such 
proposed rules may be so filed not later than the first day of May in that session. Such rules shall take 
effect on the following first day of July, unless prior to such day the General Assembly adopts a 
concurrent resolution of disapproval. All laws in conflict with such rules shall be of no further force or 
effect after such rules have taken effect.”).
2https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol66/iss1/7
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II, § 12—since the adoption of the 1851 Constitution.3
Although Art. IV, § 5(B) now grants rulemaking authority to the court, the 
Amendment is silent on what authority, if any, the General Assembly retains after the 
Supreme Court of Ohio exercises its authority allocated under the Amendment. This
silence has produced lingering uncertainties in Ohio law. This Article proposes an 
amendment to Art. IV, § 5(B) that would fill the void.
II.    SUMMARY OF A CURRENT PROBLEM
The Modern Courts Amendment addressed several matters affecting Ohio’s court 
system. Like many provisions in the Ohio Constitution, the portion of the Amendment
that addresses rulemaking—and that became Art. IV, § 5(B)—is sparsely written.4 In 
addition to granting rulemaking power to the state supreme court, Art. IV, § 5(B) 
prescribes one consequence that flows from the court’s exercise of the authority and 
adds one limitation on the scope of that authority.5 The consequence is that a court-
promulgated rule supersedes all laws then in effect that conflict with it; it states, “[a]ll 
laws in conflict . . . shall be of no further force or effect after such rules have taken 
effect.”6 The limitation is that a court-promulgated rule may not “abridge, enlarge, or 
modify a substantive right.”7 Beyond these two features of the court’s rulemaking 
authority, Art. IV, § 5(B) is silent.8
                                                          
2 Id. art. II, § 1 (“The legislative power of the state shall be vested in a General Assembly 
consisting of a Senate and House of Representatives . . . .”).
3 See Josiah H. Blackmore II, Not from Zeus’s Head Full-Blown: The Story of Civil 
Procedure in Ohio, in 1 THE HISTORY OF OHIO LAW 441–57, 457 (Michael Les Benedict & John 
F. Winkler eds., 2004) (“In 1850 Ohioans . . . made the legislature responsible for reforming 
judicial procedure. The Modern Courts Amendment transferred that authority to the supreme 
court, leaving the legislature only the minimal authority to disapprove the court’s propositions. 
. . .”). Adopted in 1850 and as amended in 1953, the Ohio Constitution, article II, section 1 
states in pertinent part:
The legislative power of the state shall be vested in a General Assembly consisting 
of a Senate and House of Representatives but the people reserve to themselves the 
power to propose to the General Assembly laws and amendments to the 
constitution, and to adopt or reject the same at the polls on a referendum vote as 
hereinafter provided.
OHIO CONST. art. II, § 1 (amended 1953). By various statutes enacted between 1803 and 1959, 
the General Assembly addressed the topic of the Supreme Court of Ohio’s rulemaking authority 
over matters of practice and procedure,  sometimes delegating authority to the courts, sometimes 
expanding it, sometimes narrowing it, and sometimes rescinding it. See Jeffrey A. Parness & 
Christopher C. Manthey, Public Process and Supreme Court of Ohio Rulemaking, 28 CLEV. ST.
L. REV. 249, 250–55 (1979). See also JAMES L. YOUNG, OHIO LEGAL CENTER INSTITUTE, PUB.
NO. 105 1 EVIDENCE IN OHIO 2.13–2.17 (1978).
4 OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 5(B).
5 Id.
6 Id.
7 Id.
8 Id.
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The most important omission in Art. IV, § 5(B) is any reference to whether the 
General Assembly may legislate on issues of “practice and procedure” after a court-
promulgated rule takes effect.9 That question is important because—as a direct result 
of Art. IV, § 5(B)’s silence—the Supreme Court of Ohio has considered dozens of 
cases in which it attempted to divine the answer.10 Divining it, however, has been
difficult.
The court has answered this question in two ways that directly contradict each 
other. The court’s first answer was that the Modern Courts Amendment barred the 
General Assembly from legislating on a matter of practice or procedure once the court 
successfully promulgated a rule on the matter.11 A more recent line of cases, however, 
held that the General Assembly may change the content of a court-promulgated rule 
of practice or procedure, but only if the legislature intended to convert the procedural 
matter addressed in the rule into a “substantive right.”12 In announcing this second 
interpretation of Art. IV, § 5(B), however, the court did not overrule or modify its 
ruling in the first interpretation.13 Moreover, the court has yet to do so when applying 
its second interpretation in later cases.14
The two interpretations cannot both be correct. The court cannot bar the General 
Assembly from legislating on a matter of practice or procedure and simultaneously 
recognize that the General Assembly retained the power to do so.
The mere existence of inconsistent interpretations does not itself justify amending
the constitution. But this inconsistency relating to practice and procedure is a rare 
instance that does require such amendment.
If Art. IV, § 5(B)’s few clauses were statutory rather than constitutional, the 
provision giving authority to the supreme court might easily be harmonized with the 
General Assembly’s plenary legislative authority under Art. II, §1.15 A court applying 
common-law rules of statutory interpretation might reason that a statute worded like 
Art. IV, § 5(B) leaves legislative authority in the General Assembly, except to the 
extent that the Amendment clearly places authority in the court.16 This interpretive 
                                                          
9 Id.
10 See, e.g., State ex rel. Loyd v. Lovelady, 840 N.E.2d 1062 (Ohio 2006); Rockey v. 84 
Lumber Co., 611 N.E.2d 789 (Ohio 1993).
11 Rockey, 611 N.E.2d 791–92 (“The Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure, which were 
promulgated by the Supreme Court pursuant to Section 5(B), Article IV of the Ohio Constitution,
must control over subsequently enacted inconsistent statutes purporting to govern procedural 
matters”) (internal footnote omitted), aff’d, State ex rel. Ohio Acad. of Trial Lawyers v. 
Sheward, 715 N.E.2d 1062 (Ohio 1999).
12 Havel v. Villa St. Joseph, 963 N.E.2d 1270 (Ohio 2012); Lovelady, 840 N.E.2d at 1064 
(“If the legislature intended the enactment to be substantive, then no intrusion on this court’s 
exclusive authority over procedural matters has occurred. . . . Thus, although [the statute is] . . .
necessarily packaged in procedural wrapping, it is clear to us that the General Assembly 
intended to create a substantive right to address potential injustice”) (emphasis added).
13 Lovelady, 840 N.E.2d. at 1063–65.
14 Havel, 963 N.E.2d at 1277–79.
15 Compare OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 5(B), with id. art. II § 1.
16 See id. art. IV, § 5(B).
4https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol66/iss1/7
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technique for filling the void in a statute is not available when interpreting a 
constitution17—at least not in a way that would have a permanent effect on the 
meaning of the constitution. 
First, common-law rules for interpretation and construction stand on a different 
footing when used to interpret statutes than when used to interpret constitutions.18 The 
common-law rules work well when applied to legislation—or similar forms of positive 
law—because the rules rest ultimately upon the recognition that the enacting body has 
the power to amend the legislation and, thus, to correct it or to otherwise respond to 
judicial interpretations.19 That ease of correction is not present when changing a 
constitution.20 Because amending the constitution requires statewide voter approval, 
the process—even in Ohio—is arduous and expensive.21 As a result, rules of 
interpretation premised on ease of correction have little applicability to the 
interpretation of constitutional texts.22
Even if common-law rules for construing constitutions were the same as the rules 
for construing statutes, the rules themselves are numerous and often produce 
conflicting interpretations.23 Any attempt to fill the void in Art. IV, § 5(B) solely 
                                                          
17 See BRYAN A. GARNER ET AL., THE LAW OF JUDICIAL PRECEDENT (2016).
18 See id. at 352 (citing Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991)) (“The doctrine of 
stare decisis applies less rigidly in constitutional cases than it does in statutory cases . . . . Stare 
decisis is flexible in constitutional cases because ‘correction through legislative action is 
practically impossible.’”); see also Rocky River v. State Emp’t Relations Bd., 539 N.E.2d 103, 
106 (Ohio 1989) (“The doctrine [of stare decisis] . . . concerns . . . the construction of statutes, 
ordinances, rules and regulations. The doctrine does not apply with the same force and effect 
when constitutional interpretation is at issue.”); United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 101 (1978) 
(Brandeis, J., dissenting) (quoting Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406–08
(1932)) (“[I]n cases involving the Federal Constitution, where correction through legislative 
action is practically impossible, this court has often overruled its earlier decisions. The Court 
bows to the lessons of experience and the force of better reasoning, recognizing that the process 
of trial and error, so fruitful in the physical sciences, is appropriate also in the judicial 
function.”).
19 GARNER ET AL., supra note 17, at 352.
20 Id.
21 See OHIO CONST. art XVI, §1.
22 Id.
23 Karl Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons 
About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 401 (1950); cf. CARLETON K.
ALLEN, LAW IN THE MAKING 578 (7th ed. 1964) (echoing Llewellyn by saying that “[t]here is 
scarcely a rule of statutory interpretation, however orthodox, which is not qualified by large 
exceptions, some of which so nearly approach flat contradictions that the rule itself seems to 
totter on its base”); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: 
Clear Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593, 596 (1992) (“We 
agree that the malleability of the canons prevents them from constraining the Court or forcing 
certain results in statutory interpretation through deductive reasoning from first canonical 
principles. Yet we also think that the substantive canons are connected in an important way with 
the results the Court reaches in statutory cases . . . . The canons are one means by which the 
Court expresses the value choices that it is making or strategies it is taking when it interprets 
statutes (thus, results produce canons). . . . The precise way in which a Court deploys 
5Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2017
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through judicial application of a common-law rules of interpretation or construction 
would endure only until the court—perhaps when differently aligned politically—
focuses on a different rule of interpretation that supports some other reading of the 
constitution.
Exacerbating the inadequacy of these common-law rules of interpretation is the 
Amendment’s sparse language. There was simply not enough firm ground—i.e. not 
enough in textual content—in the Amendment for the Supreme Court of Ohio to build 
a compelling answer to where Art. IV, § 5(B) leaves the full breadth of authority to 
prescribe the content of court rules. 
The amendment proposed in this Article would fill the void permanently by 
interlineating language that would answer this question. The amendment would do so 
by inserting language that reflects the court’s second interpretation. 
Selecting the second interpretation, rather than the first, is not arbitrary. This
proposal rejects the court’s first interpretation—holding the General Assembly to be
disenfranchised once a court-promulgated rule of practice or procedure becomes 
effective under Art. IV, § 5(B).24 There are two reasons. First, that interpretation 
suffers from a fundamental, structural flaw. Its allocation of mutually exclusive 
spheres of legislative authority between the court and legislature turns on a false and 
irredeemably blurred distinction between substance and procedure. Second, the 
court’s first interpretation of its lawmaking authority recognized no veto authority in 
the Governor, but only in the transient and demonstrably fragile authority that Art. IV, 
§ 5(B) currently affords the General Assembly to review a proposed Rule.25 If the first 
interpretation resurfaced as the prevailing law of Ohio, the court would again act
effectively as the only governmental check on the exercise of its own rulemaking 
activity. 
The path we propose reflects the Modern Courts Amendment’s ancestry. The 
rulemaking provisions of the Modern Courts Amendment were modeled after the 
federal Rules Enabling Act of 1934.26 The Supreme Court of Ohio’s second 
interpretation recognizes a relationship between the General Assembly and the court 
that allows for shared authority in court rulemaking; this sharing resembles what the 
Rules Enabling Act created between Congress and the Supreme Court of the United 
States.27
                                                          
substantive canons of statutory construction reflects an underlying ‘ideology,’ or mix of values 
and strategies that the Court brings to statutory interpretation.”).
24 Rockey v. 84 Lumber Co., 611 N.E.2d 789 (Ohio 1993).
25 Id.
26 Rules Enabling Act of 1934, ch. 651, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934) (current version at 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2071 (2017)).
27 The Honorable Jeffrey S. Sutton of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth 
Circuit has long urged state courts to recognize that their state constitutions need not be 
interpreted in the same way that federal courts interpret the U.S. Constitution, even when 
provisions of the federal constitutions are worded similarly. See, e.g., Jeffrey S. Sutton, What 
Does—and Does Not—Ail State Constitutional Law, 59 U. KAN. L. REV. 687, 710 (2011)
(“There is no reason to think, as an interpretive matter, that constitutional guarantees of 
independent sovereigns, even guarantees with the same or similar words, must be construed the 
same. Still less is there reason to think that a highly generalized guarantee, such as a prohibition 
on ‘unreasonable’ searches, would have just one meaning for a range of differently situated 
6https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol66/iss1/7
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This Article proposes that the legislature amend Art. IV, § 5(B) by adding the 
italicized language: 
(B) The supreme court shall prescribe rules governing practice and 
procedure in all courts of the state, which rules shall not abridge, enlarge, 
or modify any substantive right. Proposed rules shall be filed by the court, 
not later than the fifteenth day of January, with the clerk of each house of 
the general assembly during a regular session thereof, and amendments to 
any such proposed rules may be so filed not later than the first day of May 
in that session. Such rules shall take effect on the following first day of 
July, unless prior to such day the general assembly adopts a concurrent 
resolution of disapproval. All laws in conflict with such rules shall be of no 
further force or effect after such rules have taken effect. The general 
assembly may change rules promulgated hereunder by introducing a bill 
(1) that states in its preamble specifically that it is the legislature’s purpose 
to create a substantive right and (2) that is enacted into law as provided in 
Article II, Section 16.
III. THE MODERN COURTS AMENDMENT AND THE FEDERAL RULES ENABLING ACT
Congress enacted the federal Rules Enabling Act in 1934.28 It authorizes the United 
States Supreme Court “to prescribe, by general rules, . . . the practice and procedure 
of the district courts of the United States . . . .”29 In the decades that followed its 
enactment, the Enabling Act was the fountainhead for a deluge of court rulemaking, 
both federally and in the states.30 The Supreme Court of the United States, exercising 
its authority granted under the Act, began the flow by promulgating Rules of Civil 
                                                          
sovereigns.”); see also William J. Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual
Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1977). 
By proposing to amend Art. IV, § 5(B) in a manner that would create an effect similar to that 
created by the federal Rules Enabling Act, this proposed amendment does not conflict with 
Judge Sutton’s view of states’ autonomy. This proposal is driven, not by any reflexive deference 
to the federal approach to rulemaking, but rather by the fact that shared authority in prescribing 
the content of court rules is the only workable way to approach any allocation of rulemaking 
that separates the authority between court and legislature based on the false dichotomy between 
substance and procedure.
28 Rules Enabling Act of 1934, ch. 651, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934) (current version at 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2071 (2017)).
29 Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015, 1106 
(1982).
30 The reasons why the Rules Enabling Act of 1934 spawned this rush of court-promulgated 
rules are beyond the scope of this Article. The United States Supreme Court had been authorized 
since at least 1842 “to regulate the whole practice [in the district and circuit courts of the United 
States], so as to prevent delays, and to promote brevity and succinctness in all pleadings and 
proceedings therein, and to abolish all unnecessary costs and expenses in any suit therein.” Act 
of August 23, 1842, ch. 188, § 6, 5 Stat. 516, 518 (1842). For the evolution of the Supreme 
Court’s rulemaking authority before enactment of the Rules Enabling Act, see Burbank, supra
note 29, at 1034–98. A very small number of state legislatures had already passed bills 
authorizing courts to promulgate rules of procedure. See, e.g., Rulemaking Principle Enacted in 
Delaware and Washington, 9 J. AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y 134 (1925).
7Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2017
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Procedure in 1938.31 Under parallel legislation, the Court eventually issued rules 
covering, among others, criminal32 and appellate procedure.33 Many states have since 
come to accept rulemaking authority in their highest courts, whether shared with the 
state legislature34—as the great majority of states do35—or held exclusively by the 
court.36 Most states have allocated this authority by statutory delegation or by 
variously worded constitutional amendments.37
With adoption of the Modern Courts Amendment in 1968, Ohio joined—albeit 
belatedly38—the movement toward court-promulgated rules.39 The Amendment was 
                                                          
31 Burbank, supra note 29, at 1028.
32 Effective March 21, 1946. See 327 U.S. 821; CONG. REC., vol. 91, pt. 1, p. 17, Exec. 
Comm. 4; H. Doc. 12, 79th Cong.
33 Effective July 1, 1968. See 389 U.S. 1063; CONG. REC., vol. 114, pt. 1, p. 113, Exec. 
Comm. 1361; H. Doc. 204, 90th Cong.
34 See, e.g., MD. CONST. art. IV, pt. I, § 18(a) (“The Court of Appeals from time to time 
shall adopt rules and regulations concerning the practice and procedure in and the administration 
of the appellate courts and in the other courts of this State, which shall have the force of law 
until rescinded, changed or modified by the Court of Appeals or otherwise by law. The power 
of courts other than the Court of Appeals to make rules of practice and procedure, or 
administrative rules, shall be subject to the rules and regulations adopted by the Court of
Appeals or otherwise by law.”).
35 See infra notes 219–23 and accompanying text.
36 See, e.g., MICH. CONST. art. VI, § 5 (“The supreme court shall by general rules establish, 
modify, amend and simplify the practice and procedure in all courts of this state. . . .”); 
McDougall v. Schanz, 597 N.W.2d 148, 154 (Mich. 1999) (“It is beyond question that the 
authority to determine rules of practice and procedure rests exclusively with this Court.”).
37 See infra notes 219–23 and accompanying text.
38 By 1968, the Supreme Court of the United States had already recognized that the 
distinction between substance and procedure, which lies at the heart of the Modern Courts 
Amendment’s allocation of rulemaking authority, is a false dichotomy. See Hanna v. Plumer, 
380 U.S. 460, 465 (1965); discussion infra Parts III–IV.
A fundamental rethinking about the relationship between substance and procedure in the 
rulemaking context had already begun. See Robert G. Bone, The Process of Making Process: 
Court Rulemaking, Democratic Legitimacy, and Procedural Efficacy, 87 GEO. L.J. 877, 900 
(1999) (“The professional romance with court rulemaking and the Federal Rules began to sour 
in the early 1970s. Critics attacked the notion that there was an ideal procedure embedded in 
existing practice and codified in the Federal Rules. As a result, the boundary between procedure 
and substance blurred, and the case for expert rulemaking weakened. During the 1960s and early 
1970s, new substantive rights were created in response to growing public concern about civil 
rights, consumer welfare, and environmental protection. At the same time, public interest groups 
and lawyers inspired by the successes of the civil rights movement began to view litigation as a 
vehicle for social reform. The resulting changes in the character of federal litigation gave rise 
to concerns about the adequacy of the existing procedural system to promote substantive values. 
Many of the new public interest cases . . . focused attention on the close relationship between 
procedure and substantive law.”) (internal citations omitted).
39 See Blackmore II, supra note 3, at 457.
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“the most significant change in the judiciary since ratification of the Ohio Constitution 
of 1850.”40
The kinship between the Modern Courts Amendment and the federal Rules 
Enabling Act is evident in their striking similarities.41 One similar provision is the 
clause authorizing the Supreme Court of Ohio to “prescribe rules governing practice 
and procedure in all courts of the state.”42 That clause is now Art. IV, § 5(B).43 Besides 
using nearly identical language to grant authority to prescribe laws “governing 
practice and procedure in all courts,” the Ohio amendment uses identical language 
prohibiting the court from promulgating a rule that would “abridge, enlarge, or modify 
any substantive right.”44 Art. IV, § 5(B) also has a supersession clause like the one in 
the Rule Enabling Act.45 Both state that, if an existing statute conflicts with a duly 
                                                          
40 Id.
41 Compare OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 5(B) with 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1966). From 1966 until 
the Modern Courts Amendment was adopted, the federal Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072, 
stated:
Rules of civil procedure for district courts.
The Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe, by general rules, the forms of 
process, writs, pleadings, and motions, and the practice and procedure of the district 
courts of the United States in civil actions. 
Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right and shall preserve 
the right of trial by jury as at common law and as declared by the Seventh Amendment 
to the Constitution.
Such rules shall not take effect until they have been reported to Congress by the 
Attorney General at the beginning of a regular session and until after the close of such 
session.
All laws in conflict with such rules shall be of no further force or effect after such rules 
have taken effect. Nothing in this title, anything to the contrary notwithstanding, shall 
in any way limit, supersede, or repeal any such rules heretofore prescribed by the 
Supreme Court.
28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1966). For the succession of amendments to the 1934 Act before the 
enactment of the Modern Courts Amendment, see Stuart M. Lockman, Congressional 
Discretion in Dealing with the Federal Rules of Evidence, 6 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 798, 799 n.9 
(1973). For more historical background of the Rules Enabling Act of 1934, see 4 CHARLES A.
WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, CIVIL § 1001 
(2005); Charles E. Clark & James WM. Moore, A New Federal Civil Procedure: I. The 
Background, 44 YALE L.J. 387 (1935); George H. Jaffin, Federal Procedural Revision, 21 VA.
L. REV. 504 (1935); Edson R. Sunderland, The Grant of Rule-Making Power to the Supreme 
Court of the United States, 32 MICH. L. REV. 1116 (1934).
42 Another provision of the Modern Courts Amendment gave the supreme court authority 
over all matters regarding the admission to the bar and the discipline of lawyers and judges. 
OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 2(B)(1)(g).
43 OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 5(B).
44 Id.
45 Id.
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promulgated court rule, the statute will no longer have any force or effect after the rule 
takes effect.46
The process for promulgating rules is also similar. Each court may propose a rule 
of practice or procedure only once a year.47 The legislature then has a defined period 
in which to consider the proposed rule.48 Unless the legislature takes action by a 
designated date to disapprove the proposed rule, the court’s proposal becomes law by 
default.49
Even more important than what the Rules Enabling Act and the Modern Courts 
Amendment say is what the two texts leave unsaid. Both are silent on two crucial
questions. First, neither defines how “a rule of practice and procedure” is to be 
distinguished from “a substantive right.”50 As discussed infra, this silence remains a 
vexing problem.51 Second, even though both the Enabling Act and Art. IV, § 5(B) 
contain supersession clauses stating that existing statutory law inconsistent with a 
newly promulgated court rule is deemed repealed, neither addresses whether or to 
what extent Congress or the General Assembly may legislate on a matter of “practice 
and procedure” after a court-promulgated rule takes effect.52 The Ohio Constitution’s 
                                                          
46 Compare OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 5(B) (“All laws in conflict with such rules shall be of 
no further force or effect after such rules have taken effect.”) with Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. 
§ 723(b) (1934) (“All laws in conflict with such rules shall be of no further force or effect after 
such rules have taken effect.”).
47 Compare OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 5(B) (“Proposed rules shall be filed by the court, not 
later than the fifteenth day of January, with the clerk of each house of the general assembly 
during a regular session thereof”) with 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1950) (corresponds to the version 
amended by the Act of May 10, 1950, ch. 174, § 2, 64 Stat. 158 (stating that proposed rules 
must be “reported to Congress by the Attorney General at the beginning of a regular session”).
48 Compare OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 5(B) (“Such rules shall take effect on the following first
day of July, unless prior to such day the general assembly adopts a concurrent resolution of 
disapproval”) with 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2017) (“Such rules shall not take effect . . . until after the 
close of such session”).
49 See OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 5(B).
50 Paul D. Carrington, ‘Substance’ and ‘Procedure’ in the Rules Enabling Act, 1989 DUKE 
L.J. 281, 284 (1989).
51 Id. (“The interpretive problem [with the Rules Enabling Act] lay in the mystic terms 
‘substance’ and ‘procedure’ as used in the Act.”). Specifically addressing Art. IV, § 5(B), James 
L. Young described the substance/procedural dichotomy as the central source of uncertainty in 
the Modern Courts Amendment. He wrote:
Historically, the responsibility for procedural rules has been within the legislative 
prerogative and also within the judicial prerogative. The approach has varied with the 
times. The Modern Courts Amendment resolves a part of the problem by placing a duty 
for procedural rules on the Supreme Court. It leaves the underlying question
unanswered. That question is the distinction between substance and procedure . . . .
Young, supra note 3, at 2.17.
52 Id. at 322.
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silence on this point also implicates an elementary part of the separation-of-powers 
doctrine.53
As discussed below, the silence about Congress’s authority has caused little 
disruption under the federal Rules Enabling Act. And the silence about the General 
Assembly’s authority presented only a theoretical problem in 1968 when Ohio ratified 
the Modern Courts Amendment. But the omission has become a recurring problem in 
Ohio because the Ohio legislature often enacts legislation that conflicts with court-
promulgated, apparently procedural rules.54
One might naturally assume that two similar pieces of positive law, the Rules 
Enabling Act and Art. IV, § 5(B), would generate similar judicial interpretations. They 
have not. Instead, the federal and Ohio experiences have substantial differences. Since 
1934, the United States Supreme Court never has held that a court-promulgated rule 
abridged, enlarged, or modified a substantive right. In fact, the Court has rarely faced 
this question.55
This is quite different from the Ohio experience. Since 1968, the Supreme Court 
of Ohio has considered more than three dozen cases involving potential conflicts 
between statutes and court rules.56 Finding conflicts in at least thirty-two of those 
cases, the court was obliged to determine whether it was the statute or the rule that 
was unconstitutional under Art. IV, § 5(B).57
Why the difference between the federal experience and Ohio’s? The difference 
stems from one vastly important distinction between the federal Rules Enabling Act 
and Ohio’s Modern Courts Amendment. The Enabling Act is an act of Congress; it is 
legislation.58 In it, Congress delegated rulemaking authority to the Supreme Court.59
The Modern Courts Amendment, however, is a constitutional provision.60 It lodges the 
authority to prescribe “rules governing practice and procedure”—an area over which 
the General Assembly theretofore had legislative authority61—in the Supreme Court 
of Ohio as a matter of constitutional allocation, not by delegation through legislative 
                                                          
53 See id. at 326.
54 Cf. William W. Milligan & James E. Pohlman, The 1968 Modern Courts Amendment to 
the Ohio Constitution, 29 OHIO ST. L.J. 811, 829 (1968).
55 See generally Carrington, note 50, at 322–26.
56 See infra note 81 and accompanying text.
57 Id.
58 Rules Enabling Act of 1934, ch. 651, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934) (current version at 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2071 (2017)).
59 Id.
60 OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 5(B).
61 Milligan & Pohlman, supra note 54, at 829 (“Prior to this constitutional amendment, 
practice and procedure in Ohio have been governed by statute”); see also Blackmore II, supra
note 3; cf. Morrison v. Steiner, 290 N.E.2d 841, 843 (Ohio 1972) (“Venue is a procedural matter. 
Although once the private domain of the General Assembly, it is now properly within the rule-
making power of the [Ohio] Supreme Court under Section 5(B), Article IV of the Constitution 
of Ohio”).
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authority.62 Constitutional allocation implicates the checks-and-balances aspect of the 
separation-of-powers doctrine; delegation does not.63
Unfortunately for Ohio, the presumed dichotomy between substance and 
procedure provides little analytical assistance in defining the difference in areas of 
legislative and court rulemaking authority.64 Moreover, the distinction between 
delegated authority and constitutional allocation was not fully appreciated when Ohio 
adopted the Modern Courts Amendment.65 These combined facts make the silence in 
Art. IV, § 5(B) far more significant in Ohio than the same silence in the federal system.
                                                          
62 See generally STEPHEN H. STEINGLASS & GINO J. SCARSELLI, THE OHIO STATE 
CONSTITUTION 65 (2011) (stating that the Modern Courts Amendment’s grant of authority to 
the court “differs from the federal system in which the U.S. Supreme Court derives its rule-
making authority from . . . the Rules Enabling Act, rather than directly from the federal 
constitution”).
63 See id.
64 Leslie M. Kelleher, Taking ‘Substantive Rights’ (in the Rules Enabling Act) More 
Seriously, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 47, 69–70 (1998) (“The precise boundaries of purely 
procedural matters are . . . of little practical significance for a separation of powers analysis.”). 
See also Young, supra note 3, at 2.16–2.17.
65 Cf. Milligan & Pohlman, supra note 54. A study of law reviews published since 1969 
that discussed adoption of the Modern Courts Amendment revealed no discussion of the 
dissimilar sources of the court’s rulemaking power.
Ohio’s selection of the Rules Enabling Act as the model on which to ground its venture into 
court lawmaking may not have been the wisest. The Enabling Act model brought with it 
interpretive problems that have remained intractable.
To this day, no real consensus has developed as to how the Act should be interpreted.
. . . .
The principal reason why construction of the Rules Enabling Act has eluded anything 
approaching consensus lies in the two key sections of the Act. One section requires the 
rulemakers “to prescribe general rules of practice and procedure . . . . The other 
operative provision specifies that rulemaking under the Act “shall not abridge, enlarge 
or modify any substantive right.” The question is, how should the two sections be 
construed when taken together? What distinguishes a permissible rule from an 
impermissible one?
. . . .
[T]he last seventy years of doctrine and scholarship have failed to produce a generally 
accepted construction of the procedural-substantive interplay of the Act’s two key 
provisions.
Martin H. Redish & Dennis Murashko, The Rules Enabling Act and the Procedural-Substantive 
Tension: A Lesson in Statutory Interpretation, 93 MINN. L. REV. 26, 27–31 (2008). 
On a more fundamental level, the context in which the federal Rules Enabling Act was enacted 
was fundamentally different from the context to which the drafters of the Modern Courts 
Amendment wished to apply the structure and content that they lifted from the federal Rules 
Enabling Act. The federal Act arose out of a decades-long movement to create a uniform set of 
rules applicable in all federal district courts across the country. The most potent and fundamental 
problem that the movement faced was achieving a uniformity that was workable in all cases that 
were controlled by the Rules of Decision Act of 1789, i.e., in both federal-question cases and 
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IV. “SUBSTANTIVE RIGHT” VERSUS “PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE”
In both the federal and Ohio systems for allocating rulemaking authority, the 
allocation between court and legislature turns on the distinction between a 
“substantive right” and “practice and procedure.”66 The distinction is inherently
vague,67 notoriously difficult to define in the abstract, and even harder to apply.68 As 
a result, its utility as the sole criterion for marking the constitutional boundary between 
legislative and judicial domains is functionally nil.
For the purpose of defining the Court’s rulemaking authority under the federal 
Rules Enabling Act, the United States Supreme Court has essentially given up trying 
to ascribe any predictive, consistent distinction between substance and procedure. In 
Hanna v. Plumer,69 the Court acknowledged that substance and procedure sometimes 
mean different things in different contexts and that they sometimes overlap.70 Faced 
with having to determine whether a court-promulgated rule is procedural for purposes 
of the Rules Enabling Act, the Court devised a way to avoid the issue.71 The Court
created a presumption that every rule that it successfully promulgates is procedural 
because, to have become effective, the rule had to pass through the process established 
by Congress in the Rules Enabling Act. This process included Congress’s review and, 
                                                          
diversity cases. See, e.g., Burbank, supra note 29, at 1159 n.620; Carrington, supra note 50, 
passim; John Hart Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REV. 693 passim (1974); 
Kelleher, supra note 64, passim.
In Ohio, by contrast, the fundamental problem was to lay out a workable reallocation of 
lawmaking between the supreme court and the General Assembly, i.e., separation of powers. 
The fact that Ohio’s model was fashioned for a distinctly different problem has made more 
difficult Ohio’s effort to make sense of cases decided since 1934 under the federal Act.
66 Redish & Murashko, supra note 65, at 27.
67 “A word or phrase is . . . vague when the concept to which it unquestionably refers has 
uncertain application to various factual situations.” ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER,
READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 32 (2012) (citing E. Allan Farnsworth, 
Some Considerations in the Drafting of Agreements, in DRAFTING CONTRACTS AND 
COMMERCIAL INSTRUMENTS 145, 146–47 (1971) (“A word that may or may not be applicable to 
marginal objects is vague”)); see also REED DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES 48–
49 (1975) (“[V]agueness refers to the degree to which, independently of equivocation, language 
is uncertain in its respective applications to a number of particulars”); LINDA D. JELLUM,
MASTERING STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 70 (2008) (noting that although “ambiguity is not the 
same as generalness, . . . judges routinely say that language is ambiguous when it is merely 
vague, broad, or general”).
68 Walter Wheeler Cook’s transformative article on the nonpredictive quality of the terms 
“substance” and “procedure” in legal analysis was published in 1933. Walter Wheeler Cook, 
‘Substance’ and ‘Procedure’ in the Conflict of Laws, 42 YALE L.J. 333, 336 n.10 (1933) (“The 
distinction between substantive and procedural law is artificial and illusory. In essence, there is 
none.”). For the importance of Cook’s work and its role in the debates over the appropriateness 
of specific Rules proposed by the United States Supreme Court, see Burbank, supra note 29, at 
1159 n.620.
69 Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
70 Id. at 471.
71 Id. at 461.
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eventually, its rejection of the rule or acquiescence in its adoption.72 As the Court later 
explained in Burlington Northern v. Woods,73
the study and approval given each proposed Rule by the Advisory 
Committee, the Judicial Conference, and this Court, and the statutory 
requirement that the Rule be reported to Congress for a period of review 
before taking effect . . . give the Rules presumptive validity under both the 
constitutional and statutory constraints.74
The presumption allows the Court to pass over the mystic distinction between
substance and procedure as the determinant of whether authority to address a matter 
is judicial or legislative.75 By focusing on the process for promulgating a rule rather 
than on the nature of the matter addressed in it, a rule sometimes satisfies muster under 
Hanna even though, for some purposes, the rule is substantive, not procedural.76 The 
factors that, according to the Supreme Court, give rise to the presumption will be 
discussed further infra.77
Soon after the Modern Courts Amendment was adopted, the Supreme Court of 
Ohio itself recognized that the supposed substance/procedure dichotomy is bankrupt. 
In Gregory v. Flowers, the court observed that:
[t]he distinction between substantive and procedural law is artificial and 
illusory. In essence, there is none. The remedy and the predetermined 
machinery, so far as the litigant has a recognized claim to use it, are legally 
speaking, part of the right itself. A right without a remedy for its violation 
is a command without a sanction . . . i.e., no law at all. While it may be 
convenient to distinguish between the right or liability, the remedy or 
penalty by which it is enforced, on the one hand, and the machinery by 
which the remedy is applied to the right, on the other, i.e., between 
substantive law and procedural law, it should not be forgotten that so far as 
either is law at all, it is the litigant’s right to insist upon it, i.e., it is part of 
his right. In other words, it is substantive law.78
Despite recognizing the futility of trying to ascribe any mutually exclusive distinction 
between “substantive” and “procedural”—even though the United States Supreme 
Court gave up attempting to separate substance and procedure into mutually exclusive 
                                                          
72 Id.
73 Burlington Northern v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1 (1987) (citing Hanna, 380 U.S. at 471).
74 Id. at 6.
75 Id.
76 Hanna, 380 U.S. at 468 (“The difference between the conclusion that the Massachusetts 
rule is applicable, and the conclusion that it is not, is of course at this point ‘outcome-
determinative’ in the sense that if we hold the state rule to apply, respondent prevails, whereas 
if we hold that Rule 4 (d)(1) governs, the litigation will continue. But in this sense every 
procedural variation is ‘outcome-determinative.’”).
77 See infra Part V.
78 Gregory v. Flowers, 290 N.E.2d 181, 186 (Ohio 1972) (quoting 1 CHARLES FREDERIC 
CHAMBERLAYNE, A TREATISE ON THE MODERN LAW OF EVIDENCE 217 (1911)).
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categories for purposes of allocating lawmaking authority—the Supreme Court of 
Ohio routinely struggles with this dichotomy.79 The issue arises whenever the court is 
asked to decide which branch of Ohio government has the constitutionally allocated 
authority to prescribe rules affecting practice or procedure in instances where both 
have attempted to do so.80
Since 1968, the Supreme Court of Ohio has been faced with explicating the 
allocation of legislative authority no less than thirty-six times.81 As will be discussed 
                                                          
79 See infra note 81.
80 Id.
81 Each of the cases decided by the supreme court addresses—to a greater or lesser extent—
the same two fundamental components of the lawmaking authority under OHIO CONST. art. IV, 
§ 5(B): (1) whether the statute and rule conflict and (2) whether the subject matter of the statute 
and court rule substantive or procedural. The court’s handling of the substance-procedure issue 
in those cases falls into roughly five categories:
(1) Court found no conflict between a court-promulgated rule and a statute. See State ex rel.
Sapp. v. Franklin Cty. Court of Appeals, 889 N.E.2d 500 (Ohio 2008); State ex rel. Boylen v. 
Harmon, 839 N.E.2d 934 (Ohio 2006); State ex rel. Thompson v. Spon, 700 N.E.2d 1281 (Ohio 
1998); State ex rel. Steckman v. Jackson, 639 N.E.2d 83 (Ohio 1994); State ex rel. Beacon J. 
Publ’g Co. v. Waters, 617 N.E.2d 1110 (Ohio 1993); Ky. Oaks Mall Co. v. Mitchell’s Formal 
Wear, Inc., 559 N.E.2d 477 (Ohio 1990); State v. Brown, 528 N.E.2d 523 (Ohio 1988); State v. 
Slatter, 423 N.E.2d 100 (Ohio 1981).
(2) Court found a conflict between a rule and a statute, and resolved in favor of one or the other, 
but did not attempt to explicate the difference between “practice and procedure” and a 
“substantive right” as applied to the case. See Proctor v. Kardassilaris, 873 N.E.2d 872 (Ohio 
2007); Hiatt v. S. Health Facilities, 626 N.E.2d 71 (Ohio 1994); In re Coy, 616 N.E.2d 1105 
(Ohio 1993); State ex rel. Hurt v. Kistler, 587 N.E.2d 298 (Ohio 1992); State v. Smorgala, 553 
N.E.2d 672 (Ohio 1990); State ex rel. Clark v. Toledo, 560 N.E.2d 1313 (Ohio 1990); State v. 
Rahman, 492 N.E.2d 401 (Ohio 1986); Alexander v. Buckeye Pipe Line Co., 359 N.E.2d 702 
(Ohio 1977); Boyer v. Boyer, 346 N.E.2d 286 (Ohio 1976); City of Cuyahoga Falls v. Bowers, 
459 N.E.2d 532 (Ohio 1979).
(3) Court found a conflict between a rule and a statute, attempted to define the difference 
between “practice and procedure” and a “substantive right” as applied to the case, and ruled that 
the statute prevails because a court-promulgated Rule cannot modify a substantive right. See
Havel v. Villa St. Joseph, 963 N.E.2d 1270 (Ohio 2012); Erwin v. Bryan, 929 N.E.2d 1019 
(Ohio 2010); State ex rel. Loyd v. Lovelady, 840 N.E.2d 1062 (Ohio 2006); Hartsock v. 
Chrysler Corp., 541 N.E.2d 1037 (Ohio 1989) (jurisdictional case); Malloy v. Westlake, 370 
N.E.2d 457 (Ohio 1977) (jurisdictional case); State v. Hughes, 324 N.E.2d 731 (Ohio 1975) 
(jurisdictional case); Krause v. State, 285 N.E.2d 736 (Ohio 1972) (no statute at issue in the 
case).
(4) Court found a conflict, attempted to define the difference between a rule and a statute, 
attempted to define the difference between “practice and procedure” and a “substantive right” 
as applied to the case, and ruled that the court-promulgated rule prevails because the statute is 
procedural and, therefore, either was repealed by Art. IV, § 5(B) or violates it. See Rockey v. 
84 Lumber Co., 611 N.E.2d 789 (Ohio 1993); State ex rel. Silcott v. Spahr, 552 N.E.2d 926 
(Ohio 1990); State v. Greer, 530 N.E.2d 382 (Ohio 1988); State v. Rahman, 492 N.E.2d 401 
(Ohio 1986); Johnson v. Porter, 471 N.E.2d 484 (Ohio 1984); State ex rel. Columbus v. 
Boyland, 391 N.E.2d 324 (Ohio 1979).
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in section VI, the Supreme Court of Ohio does not have the option to bypass the 
substance/procedure dichotomy the way the United States Supreme Court did in 
Hanna and Burlington Northern. Ohio cannot rely on the presumption that, if a matter 
is addressed in a court-promulgated rule, the matter is procedural. 
V. CONGRESS AND THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
“Nothing could be clearer from the pre-1934 history of the Rules Enabling Act 
than that the procedure/substance dichotomy . . . was intended to allocate lawmaking 
power between the Supreme Court as rulemaker and Congress.”82 The United States
Supreme Court has consistently recognized that its power to promulgate rules of 
practice and procedure is a power that Congress delegated to it through the federal 
Rules Enabling Act of 1934 and various parallel legislation.83 The United States
Supreme Court has authority to promulgate rules, therefore, only to the extent that and 
only so long as it possesses the authority that Congress delegated to it.84
If Congress and the Supreme Court disagree about a proposed rule of practice and 
procedure, Congress has several ways of addressing the disagreement. Congress can 
postpone the effective date of the proposed rule.85 Or Congress can rescind or modify 
                                                          
(5) The court, without further defining the difference between “practice and procedure” and a 
“substantive right,” applied the ruling of a case listed in (2) or (3) above. See Flynn v. Fairview 
Vill. Ret. Cmty. Ltd., 970 N.E.2d 927 (Ohio 2012); Myers v. Brown, 967 N.E.2d 1212 (Ohio 
2012); Seger v. For Women, Inc., 854 N.E.2d 188 (Ohio 2006); State ex rel. Ohio Acad. of Trial 
Lawyers v. Sheward, 715 N.E.2d 1062 (Ohio 1999); State ex rel. Bohlman v. O’Donnell, 628 
N.E.2d 1367 (Ohio 1994); Stark v. Arn, 613 N.E.2d 167 (Ohio 1993).
82 Burbank, supra note 29, at 1106.
83 Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 9–10, 15 (1941) (“Congress has undoubted power 
to regulate the practice and procedure of federal courts, and may exercise that power by 
delegating to this or other federal courts authority to make rules not inconsistent with the statutes 
or constitution of the United States . . . . The value of the reservation of the power to examine 
proposed rules, laws and regulations before they become effective is well understood by 
Congress. It is frequently, as here, employed to make sure that the action under the delegation 
squares with the Congressional purpose. Evidently the Congress felt the rule was within the 
ambit of the statute as no effort was made to eliminate it from the proposed body of rules . . . .”) 
(internal citations omitted); see also Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins., 559 
U.S. 393, 406–07 (2010) (“In the Rules Enabling Act, Congress authorized this Court to 
promulgate rules of procedure subject to its review, 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a) . . . .”); Hanna v. 
Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471–74 (1965) (“In the Rules Enabling Act, Congress authorized this 
Court to prescribe uniform Rules to govern the ‘practice and procedure’ of the federal district 
courts and courts of appeals.”).
84 Hanna, 380 U.S. at 473.
85 See, e.g., Act of March 30, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-12, 87 Stat. 9. The title of the Act, an 
“Act to promote the separation of constitutional powers,” indicates Congress’s concern that the 
Court had overstepped its constitutional and statutory rulemaking authority. Kelleher, supra
note 64.
By 1979, the tactic of postponing the effective date of proposed amendments to Federal Rules 
had ceased to be “a novel procedure.” 125 CONG. REC. H6376 (daily ed. July 23, 1979) 
(statement of Rep. Drinan); see generally Arthur J. Goldberg, The Constitutional Doctrine of 
Separation of Powers, 5 SETON HALL L. REV. 667, 668 (1973) (“[T]he rules enabling acts have 
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the Rules Enabling Act by which Congress delegated rulemaking authority to the 
Court. Or Congress can amend the rule that the Court submitted to Congress.86 Or 
Congress can assume legislative authority over the subject and enact legislation in 
substitution for the proposed rule.87 Finally, even after a rule proposed by the Supreme 
Court becomes law, Congress can pass legislation changing what the Supreme Court 
promulgated through its rulemaking authority.88 Congress has exercised each of these 
options at one time or another regarding the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 89 and 
Criminal Procedure.90
Congress’s most assertive action against rules that the United States Supreme 
Court proposed, however, involved the Federal Rules of Evidence, which the Court 
first proposed in 1972.91 Both houses of Congress introduced bills to postpone the 
effective date that the Supreme Court had set for the proposed Rules, thereby giving 
Congress time to examine the Court’s view of its claimed authority to promulgate 
evidence rules.92 As the postponed effective date approached, Congress enacted a bill 
that prohibited the Supreme Court’s proposed rules from taking effect. Declaring that 
rules of evidence were not matters of “practice and procedure” and, thus, not a proper 
subject for court rulemaking, Congress prohibited adoption of rules of evidence except 
and until they might be “expressly approved by Act of Congress.”93 Ultimately, the 
                                                          
been construed by both Congress and the Supreme Court to mean that Congress has the power 
to amend or veto rules transmitted by the Chief Justice.”).
86 See Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 400 (“Congress . . . has ultimate authority over the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure; it can create exceptions to an individual rule as it sees fit—either by 
directly amending the rule or by enacting a separate statute overriding it in certain instances”); 
cf. Henderson v. United States, 517 U.S. 654, 668 (1996).
87 Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 400. Congress did precisely this when the U.S. Supreme Court 
attempted to propose the Federal Rules of Evidence as rules of practice and procedure under the 
federal Rules Enabling Act. See Act of January 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926; see 
generally 21 CHARLES A. WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE, EVIDENCE § 5006 (2005).
88 Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 400.
89 For example, in the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA), Pub. L. 
No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737, Congress established pleading standards in private securities 
litigation that differed from FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a). See Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, 
Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 313–14 (2007) (“As a check against abusive litigation by private parties, 
Congress enacted the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 . . . . (PSLRA), 109 Stat. 
737. . . . As set out in § 21D(b)(2) of the PSLRA, plaintiffs must ‘state with particularity facts 
giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the required state of mind.’”).
90 For example, Congress amended Rule 6(e)(3)(C) of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure in the Homeland Security Act of 2002. See Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. 
No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135, tit. VIII, § 895 (2002) (amending FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(3)(C)).
91 Paul F. Rothstein, The Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Evidence, 62 GEO.
L.J. 125, 125 (1973).
92 119 CONG. REC. 2395–96 (1973) (Senate); 119 CONG. REC. 3739, 3749 (1973) (House 
of Representatives).
93 Act of March 30, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-12, 87 Stat. 9 (“Be it enacted . . . [t]hat 
notwithstanding any other provisions of law, the Rules of Evidence for United States Courts 
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Federal Rules of Evidence became law as a statute enacted through an Act of 
Congress, not as rules of practice and procedure promulgated by the Supreme Court 
under its authority in the federal Rules Enabling Act.94
The number and extent of Congress’s various options for dealing with proposed 
rules exist as attributes that flow from the foundational fact that Congress delegated 
the authority the Court exercises.95
VI.    GENERAL ASSEMBLY AND THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
In contrast to Congress’s ranging authority to participate in the process of court 
rulemaking, the sole function that Art. IV, § 5(B) recognizes for the General Assembly 
regarding the court’s rulemaking authority is the power to disapprove rules of practice 
or procedure within a prescribed period after they are proposed.96 If the General 
Assembly is to act at all regarding a proposed rule, it must do so by adopting a 
concurrent resolution of disapproval by June 30 of the year in which the court 
submitted the proposal to the legislature for review.97 Unless both houses of the
General Assembly concur in the resolution, the proposed rule becomes law by 
default.98
The surprising history of the Ohio Rules of Evidence demonstrates how fleeting 
and fragile the power to disapprove can be, lodged as it is in a multi-layered, 
intentionally slow-acting, and easily stalled General Assembly.
A. The Strange and Revealing History of the Ohio Rules of Evidence
As discussed above, the proposed Federal Rules of Evidence became the reagent 
for analyzing the respective roles of Congress and the United States Supreme Court in 
rulemaking. The Supreme Court of Ohio’s proposed Ohio Rules of Evidence had a
similar effect. The debates that erupted over the proposed Ohio Rules of Evidence—
which are remembered as the Ohio Evidence War—brought into high relief the 
uncertainty inherent in the false dichotomy between substance and procedure and, 
thus, the confusion over what is properly within the legislative domains of court and 
legislature.99 The conflict that ensued also demonstrated the impotence of a concurrent 
resolution as the only check on the Supreme Court of Ohio’s rulemaking power.100
                                                          
and Magistrates . . . shall have no force or effect except to the extent, and with such 
amendments, as they may be expressly approved by Act of Congress.”).
94 Act of Jan. 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926. For a summary of Congress’s 
unusually assertive involvement in the eventual Federal Rules of Evidence, see 21 WRIGHT &
GRAHAM, JR., supra note 87.
95 Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 9 (1941).
96 OHIO CONST. art IV, § 5(B).
97 Id.
98 Id.
99 See Act of January 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat 1926.
100 Id.
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The first version of the Proposed Ohio Rules of Evidence was published for review 
and public comment on February 21, 1977.101 A substantially different version 
eventually became law three years later on July 1, 1980. During the intervening years, 
however, the General Assembly acted as assertively in reacting to the proposed Ohio 
Rules of Evidence as Congress had acted in response to the proposed Federal Rules of 
Evidence.
As originally proposed, the Ohio Rules of Evidence were modeled very closely 
after the Federal Rules.102 They were so closely modeled that, for example, they would 
have made evidence law in Ohio subject to change by Congress.103 The Office of Ohio 
Attorney General William J. Brown was the only party to publicly urge rejection of 
the proposed Rules.104 Nevertheless, on recommendation from the Joint Committee of 
the House and Senate Judiciary Committees,105 the General Assembly by unanimous 
votes in both houses adopted a Concurrent Resolution of Disapproval.106 Among 
several reasons for its opposition, the General Assembly was concerned that codified 
evidence rules—at least those patterned after the Federal Rules—would affect 
substantive rights and, to that extent, were not properly within the court’s 
constitutional authority to prescribe rules under Art. IV, § 5(B).107
Shortly after rejecting the Rules of Evidence, the General Assembly adopted 
another resolution, Amended Senate Joint Resolution 25.108 The resolution created a 
joint select committee that was to study the proposed Ohio Rules of Evidence and 
                                                          
101 Proposed Ohio Rules of Evidence, 50 OHIO B. 231 (1977).
102 Id.
103 For example, Proposed Ohio Evidence Rule 402 stated, “[a]ll relevant evidence is 
admissible, except as otherwise provided by the Constitution of the United States, by the 
Constitution of the State of Ohio, by Act of Congress, by statute enacted by the General 
Assembly not in conflict with an existing rule of the Supreme Court of Ohio, by these rules, or 
by other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court of Ohio. Evidence which is not relevant is not 
admissible.” Id. at 235–36 (emphasis added). Also, Proposed Ohio Evidence Rule 802 stated, 
“[h]earsay is not admissible except as otherwise provided by the Constitution of the United 
States, by the Constitution of the State of Ohio, by Act of Congress.” Id. at 246 (emphasis 
added).
104 See Proposed Ohio Rules of Evidence, supra note 101, at 231–57.
105 JOINT SUBCOMM. TO THE HOUSE AND SENATE JUDICIARY COMMS., REPORT ON THE 
PROPOSED OHIO RULES OF EVIDENCE, 112th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. 1 (1977-78), reprinted in
Richard S. Walinski & Howard Abramoff, Proposed Ohio Rules of Evidence: The Case Against,
28 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 344, 393 app. C (1978). Members of the Joint Subcommittee were 
Senators Anthony J. Celebrezze, Jr. (D.–Cleveland); Michael Schwarzwalder (D.–Columbus), 
Stanley J. Aronoff (R.—Cincinnati); and Representatives Paul Leonard (D.–Dayton); Terry 
Tranter (D.–Cincinnati); and William Batchelder (R.–Medina). Id. at 348 n.21; see also 
Proposed Ohio Rules of Evidence, supra note 101, at 231.
106 Am. H. Con. Res. 14, 112th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (1977-78), reprinted in Walinski 
& Abramoff, supra note 105, at 388 app. A [hereinafter Resolution 14].
107 Id.; see also Walinski & Abramoff, supra note 105, at 347–49, 388 app. A, 393 app. C.
108 Am. S.J. Res. 25, 112th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (1977-78), reprinted in Walinski & 
Abramoff, supra note 105, at 390 app. B; see also Walinski & Abramoff, supra note 105, at 
349, 355.
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evidence-reform generally.109 The General Assembly’s Concurrent Resolution stated: 
“Congress of the United States has already considered the subject of codification of 
the law of evidence and determined that . . . codification is the proper function of the 
legislative rather than the judicial branch of government.”110
In 1978, the court proposed an identical version of the Ohio Rules of Evidence.111
The result in 1978 was the same as in 1977: unanimous disapproval in both houses.112
In 1978, however, wide opposition to court-adopted evidence rules patterned after the 
federal rules emerged.113 In addition to the Attorney General’s Office, opposition to 
the Proposed Ohio Rules of Evidence came from the Ohio Association of Prosecuting 
Attorneys, the Ohio Public Defenders Association, the Ohio Academy of Trial 
Lawyers, the Ohio Defense Association, the Ohio State Bar Association’s Negligence 
Law Committee, as well as various major law firms and individual practitioners in the 
state.114
In 1979, the court submitted nothing.115 But the House took the initiative by 
introducing H.B. 684.116 The bill proposed a statutory code of evidence that, as 
introduced, was identical in all material respects to what the supreme court had 
proposed in 1977 and 1978.117 Representative Terry M. Tranter’s purpose in 
introducing the bill was to stake out for the General Assembly the same legislative 
authority over the eventual Ohio Rules of Evidence that Congress had preserved for 
itself by enacting the Federal Rules of Evidence by statute.118
In 1980, the Supreme Court of Ohio forced the constitutional issue that had first 
emerged in 1977: whether it or the General Assembly had authority to write evidence 
                                                          
109 Walinski & Abramoff, supra note 105, at 390 app. B.
110 Id. Highly respected sources in Ohio warned of the uncertainty that surrounded the 
Supreme Court of Ohio’s claimed authority to promulgate rules of evidence under the Modern 
Courts Amendment. In 1978, James L. Young wrote that, because the court’s authority to 
promulgate rules turned on the distinction between substance and procedure, the Modern Courts 
Amendment, could not answer whether rules of evidence were in the province of the General 
Assembly or the supreme court. He said that Art. IV, § 5(B) leaves unanswered where 
rulemaking authority ultimately lies because “that question is the distinction between procedure 
and substance and in the law of evidence it is a question not easily answered.” Young, supra
note 3, at 2.17. 
111 Proposed Ohio Rules of Evidence, 51 OHIO B. 181 (1978).
112 H. Con. Res. 43, 112th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (1977-78).
113 Hon. William J. Brown & Richard S. Walinski, Ohio Rules of Evidence: An Open Letter 
to the Bar of Ohio, 51 OHIO B. 1637 (1978).
114 For additional information about the process that produced the 1977 and 1978 Proposed 
Ohio Rules of Evidence as well as about the legislature’s disapproval of both proposals, see 
Parness & Manthey, supra note 3. See also PAUL C. GIANNELLI, EVIDENCE 4–5 (2010).
115 GIANNELLI, supra note 114, at 5.
116 H.B. 684, 113th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (1979-80) (“To enact sections 2318.01 to 
2318.58 of the Revised Code to establish comprehensive statutory rules of evidence.”).
117 Walinski & Abramoff, supra note 105, at 389.
118 Letter from Richard S. Walinski to A. Michael Knapp, Chair, Ohio B. Comm. on Judicial 
Admin. & Legal Reform (July 27, 1979) (on file with authors).
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law.119 The Court again filed a set of proposed evidence rules.120 The 1980 version was
partially rewritten121 to address some of the objections previously voiced against the 
Rules proposed in 1977 and 1978.122
A joint committee of the House and Senate altered its schedule and began lengthy 
hearings on the court’s 1980 proposal, enlisting a group of consultants to assist in the 
study. 123 As the joint committee completed its review of an article in the court’s 
proposed rules, the committee sent the court requests for revisions of specific rules.124
Initially, the court approved the requested changes.125 It accepted, for example, a 
change in Rule 102 that affected how all of the Ohio Rules of Evidence are to be 
interpreted.126 The court accepted the General Assembly’s suggestion that the Ohio 
Rules be interpreted in a way diametrically opposite from the way the federal 
counterpart to Rule 102 establishes for interpretation of the federal evidence rules.127
As May 1st approached, however, the court stopped accepting changes 
recommended by the legislature.128 By mid-April, members of the select committee 
recognized that their review of the proposed rules could not be completed by May 1, 
the final date set in Art. IV, § 5(B) for the court to submit amendments to proposed 
rules.129 The committee had not, for example, begun its review of Article VII (Lay and 
                                                          
119 Proposed Ohio Rules of Evidence, 53 OHIO B. 203 (1980).
120 Id. at 203–27.
121 See Walter J. Blakely, A Short Introduction to the Ohio Rules of Evidence, 10 CAP. U. L.
REV. 237, 242 (1980) (noting that the Supreme Court of Ohio filed a substantially revised draft 
of proposed Rules of Evidence in 1980).
122 See id. (stating that the revisions were made to meet criticisms of the initially proposed 
drafts that appeared in publications and that were voiced at previous hearings before the General 
Assembly). See, e.g., ‘LEGIS-letter’: State House Matters, 52 OHIO B. 1904 (1979).
123 Consultants in favor of the proposed Rules included James L. Young, Executive Director 
of the Ohio Legal Center Institute, and Paul C. Giannelli, professor at Case-Western Reserve 
School of Law. Consultants opposing the proposed Rules included John E. Martindale of Arter 
& Hadden and Richard S. Walinski of Cooper & Walinski. ‘LEGIS-letter’: State House Matters,
supra note 118, at 1904.
124 Id.
125 Amendments to Proposed Ohio Rules of Evidence, 53 OHIO B. 856–57 (1980). See also 
Blakely, supra note 121 (noting that the court accepted the General Assembly’s 
recommendations to change portions of the rules proposed in 1980).
126 Blakely, supra note 121, at 245.
127 At the request of the General Assembly in 1980, the Supreme Court of Ohio changed 
OHIO EVID. R. 102 to provide “that the rules shall be construed to state the common law of Ohio 
unless the rules clearly indicate that a change is intended.” Ohio Rules of Evidence, 53 OHIO B.
1197, 1198 (1980). In accepting the requested change, the court deleted from its proposed Rule 
language that still appears in FED. R. EVID. 102: “These rules should be construed so as to . . .
promote the development of evidence law . . . .” Id.
128 See id.
129 Id.
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Expert Opinions) or Article VIII (Hearsay).130 The Senate, therefore, introduced yet 
another concurrent resolution of disapproval.131 Once again, the Senate passed the 
Resolution unanimously.132
The Resolution was sent to the House for concurrence and was referred to the 
House Judiciary Committee.133 Chairman Harry J. Lehman refused, however, to place 
the Resolution on the committee’s agenda.134
As June 30th approached, a group of representatives attempted to force the Senate 
Resolution out of the Judiciary Committee.135 For parliamentary reasons, the effort 
failed.136 Because the Senate Resolution remained stuck in the House Judiciary 
Committee, the House failed to concur in the Senate’s unanimous disapproval of the 
court’s evidence rules.137
The unfinished revision of the Ohio Rules of Evidence became law on July 1, 1980 
for want of the House of Representatives’ concurrence in the Senate’s unanimously 
adopted Resolution of Disapproval.138 The Rules of Evidence had not received a single 
legislator’s vote of approval in either house of the General Assembly in the fours year 
after their first promulgation.139 Moreover, the successive, unanimous disapprovals 
were clear statements that the General Assembly agreed with Congress about the 
nature of evidence law; rules of evidence were not matters of “practice and procedure” 
and thus are not within the supreme court’s power under Art. IV, § 5(B) to address in 
court-made rules.140
B. The Role of the General Assembly on Matters of “Practice and Procedure”
The General Assembly’s options beyond adopting a concurrent resolution of 
disapproval are far from clear. As noted previously, Art. IV, § 5(B) itself is silent about 
whether the General Assembly may, to any extent, continue to legislate on a matter 
“governing practice and procedure” once the court promulgates a rule on the matter.141
Despite the Ohio Constitution’s silence, the General Assembly has continued to 
enact statutes that purport to alter procedures that have already been addressed in 
court-promulgated rules.142 Because of this persistent legislative activity, dozens of 
                                                          
130 Id.
131 S.J. Res. 22, 113th Gen. Assemb., Sess. 2 (1979-80).
132 See S.J. Res. 22, 1980 Ohio Legis. Bull. 148 (1980).
133 Id.
134 Id.
135 Id.
136 Id.
137 Id.
138 Id.
139 Id.
140 Id.
141 See OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 5(B).
142 See id. art. II, § 1.
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cases came before the Supreme Court of Ohio in which it had to decide (a) whether a 
statute and a court-promulgated rule were in conflict and (b) if so, whether the point 
of conflict was a matter of substance or procedure.143 Although the court has been 
confronted with the substance/procedure dualism many times, the court has shed very 
little light on what precisely the distinction denotes.144 Except in cases involving a few 
topics that settled Ohio law considers substantive—viz., subject-matter jurisdiction, 
statutes of limitation, evidentiary privileges, constitutionally protected rights, etc.—
the court has attempted in only a few cases to explain the difference between “a 
substantive right” and a rule of “practice and procedure.”145
Beginning in 1979, two distinct rules of law have emerged from these few cases. 
They provide diametrically opposite interpretations of the General Assembly’s power 
under Art. IV, § 5(B). One line holds that, after the court has promulgated a rule on 
the matter, Art. IV, § 5(B) prohibits the General Assembly from thereafter legislating 
on the matter.146 The other holds precisely the opposite: the General Assembly may 
legislate on a matter of practice or procedure even after the court has promulgated a 
rule on the matter.147
The rules of law established and followed in these two lines cannot both be correct. 
Both lines of cases, however, remain definitive holdings by the Supreme Court of Ohio
according to its own rules regarding the precedential value of its opinions.148
                                                          
143 See, e.g., State ex rel. Loyd v. Lovelady, 840 N.E.2d 1062 (Ohio 2006); Rockey v. 84 
Lumber Co., 611 N.E.2d 789 (Ohio 1993).
144 See GIANNELLI supra note 114, at 47 (“The Ohio cases interpreting the terms ‘substance’ 
and ‘procedure’ in the context of the Ohio Constitution, Article IV, § 5(B) provided little 
guidance. Most of these cases simply categorize a rule or statute as substantive or procedural,
giving little or no explanation for the choice of label”).
145 Havel v. Villa St. Joseph, 963 N.E.2d 1270 (Ohio 2012); Lovelady, 840 N.E.2d at 1062; 
State ex rel. Ohio Acad. of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward, 715 N.E.2d 1062 (Ohio 1999); Rockey,
611 N.E.2d at 789; State v. Greer, 530 N.E.2d 382 (Ohio 1988); State v. Rahman, 492 N.E.2d 
401 (Ohio 1986); Johnson v. Porter, 471 N.E.2d 484 (Ohio 1984); State ex rel. Columbus v. 
Boyland, 391 N.E.2d 324 (Ohio 1979).
146 See e.g., Rockey, 611 N.E.2d at 789.
147 See e.g., Havel, 963 N.E.2d at 1270; Lovelady, 840 N.E.2d at 1062.
148 Opinions that the Supreme Court of Ohio issued from 1858 until May 1, 2002 had 
varying precedential value, depending on whether the opinion was per curiam or signed and, if 
signed, whether the court authored a syllabus in the decision. If the majority opinion was signed, 
the precedential value of the signed opinion depended on whether the court issued a syllabus to 
the opinion. If the court authored a syllabus, it was the syllabus—not the signed opinion—that 
stated the points of law established by the ruling. Unless and until the syllabus has been 
overruled, the proposition remains controlling law in Ohio. Compare State v. Wilson, 388 
N.E.2d 745, 751 (Ohio 1979) (“The law in Ohio since 1858 has been that it is the syllabus of 
the Supreme Court decisions which states the law, i.e., the points of law decided in a case are 
to be found in the syllabus. Therefore, where the justice assigned to write the opinion discusses 
matters or expresses his opinion on questions not in the syllabus, the language is merely the 
personal opinion of the writer.”) with SUPREME COURT OF OHIO, SUPREME COURT RULES FOR 
THE REPORTING OF OPINIONS § 2.0, Rule 1(B) (2002) (stating that the law announced in an 
opinion of the Supreme Court of Ohio appears on the syllabus, text, and footnotes of the 
opinion). Furthermore, in the Sixth Circuit, the court held that “[a] per curiam opinion is entitled 
to the same weight as a syllabus in stating the law.” Truesdale v. Dallman, 690 F.2d 76, 77 n.1 
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C. Rockey v. 84 Lumber
The Supreme Court of Ohio gave its clearest statement of the rule recognized in 
the first line of cases in Rockey v. 84 Lumber.149 In that case, the court considered a 
conflict between Civil Rule 8(A), which required a plaintiff to plead the amount of 
actual damages sought, and a statute that the General Assembly enacted after adoption 
of that rule.150 The statute prohibited a plaintiff from alleging the amount of actual 
damages if it exceeded a specified dollar amount.151
The court accepted its obligation to decide the case as one turning in the first 
instance on whether the subject matter that both Rule 8(A) and the statute addressed 
was substantive or procedural.152 Years earlier, in Krause v. State, the first case 
decided after the Modern Courts Amendment was adopted, the court stated that 
“substantive” and “procedural” in law are antonyms, albeit imperfectly so.153 The court
said,
[t]he word “substantive,” as used in Section 5(B) of Article IV, is in 
contradistinction to the words “adjective” or “procedural” which pertain to 
the method of enforcing rights or obtaining redress. “Substantive” means 
that body of law which creates, defines and regulates the rights of the 
parties. (See Black’s Law Dictionary.) The word substantive refers to 
common law, statutory and constitutionally recognized rights . . . .
[A]djective [i.e., procedural] and substantive law are not always mutually 
exclusive . . . .154
In Rockey, the court declared, without explanation, that the rule and statute were 
procedural.155 It did so, however, without explaining how a procedural matter is to be 
distinguished from a substantive matter. 
The court then passed directly to the central question about which § 5(B) is silent. 
In the body of the opinion, the court stated that, because Rule 8(A) was promulgated 
under the authority of Art. IV, § 5(B), the statute left the General Assembly without 
                                                          
(6th Cir. 1982) (citing State ex rel. Canada v. Phillips, 151 N.E.2d 722, 722 syllabus ¶ 6 (Ohio 
1958)) (“Only what is stated in a syllabus or in an opinion per curiam or by the court represents 
a pronouncement of law by this court.”).
149 Rockey, 611 N.E.2d, aff’d, Ohio Acad. of Trial Lawyers, 715 N.E.2d at 1087–88 (“The 
Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure, which were promulgated by the Supreme Court pursuant to 
Section 5(B), Article IV of the Ohio Constitution, must control over subsequently enacted 
inconsistent statutes purporting to govern procedural matters. . . . [Citations to lower court 
rulings omitted.] This interpretation is the only one consistent with the original reason for 
adopting Section 5(B), Article IV of the Ohio Constitution—that of constitutionally granting 
rule-making power to the Supreme Court.”).
150 Rockey, 611 N.E.2d at 791.
151 Id. at 791–92.
152 Id.
153 Krause v. State, 285 N.E.2d 736 (Ohio 1972).
154 Id. at 744.
155 Rockey, 611 N.E.2d at 791–92.
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constitutional authority to legislate in conflict with the rule.156 Without explanation, 
the court simply declared that 
[t]his interpretation is the only one consistent with the original reason for 
adopting Section 5(B), Article IV of the Ohio Constitution—that of 
constitutionally granting rule-making power to the Supreme Court.157
Syllabus two of the opinion states: 
The Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure, which were promulgated by the 
Supreme Court pursuant to Section 5(B), Article IV of the Ohio 
Constitution, must control over subsequently enacted inconsistent statutes 
purporting to govern procedural matters.158
In holding the General Assembly disenfranchised once a procedural rule takes 
effect, the court expanded the effect of its own lawmaking authority beyond the plain 
language of Art. IV, § 5(B).159 The court offered no textual, historical, or principled 
analysis of Art. IV, § 5(B) to support disenfranchisement.160 Instead, the court ignored 
the plainly discernible meaning of the pivotal sentence discussing the effect of court-
                                                          
156 Id.
157 Id.
158 Id. at 789.
159 Id. at 791–92.
160 The court cited four lower court decisions—two as direct authorities and two as 
additional authorities—for the proposition that Art. IV, § 5(B) must necessarily be read as 
providing to the supreme court such exclusive authority over matters of “practice and 
procedure”; and that, once the court has duly promulgated a rule of practice and procedure, the 
General Assembly is thereby no longer allowed to legislate on that matter. The two decisions 
cited as direct authority were common-pleas cases. The two cited as additional authorities were 
court-of-appeals cases. One of the four cases did not stand for the proposition for which it was 
cited. Jacobs v. Shelly & Sands, Inc. involved previously, not subsequently, enacted 
legislation—the statute was effective January 1, 1975; the court-promulgated rule was effective 
July 1, 1975. Jacobs v. Shelly & Sands, Inc., 365 N.E.2d 1259 (Ohio 1975).
The other three cases simply begged the question about whether Art. IV, § 5(B) affects the 
constitutionality of legislation on procedural matters enacted after the court had duly 
promulgated a rule. They merely assumed the legal proposition they were asked to decide. They 
all began their analyses by stating that court-promulgated rules of practice and procedure prevail 
over statutes regardless of whether the statute existed at the time the court rule took effect or 
was enacted after the rules had been promulgated. See In re Vickers Children, 470 N.E.2d 438, 
442 (Ohio Ct. App. 1983) (stating that without legal or historical analysis that “[i]t is clear that 
the Juvenile Rules . . . must control over subsequently enacted inconsistent statutes purporting 
to govern procedural matters. Any other interpretation would gut Section 5(B), Article IV, of 
its essential purpose, that of constitutionally granting rule-making power to the Supreme 
Court.”); Simon v. St. Elizabeth Med. Ctr., 355 N.E.2d 903, 905 (Ohio Ct. App. 1976) (citing 
Graley v. Satayatham, 343 N.E.2d 832 (Ohio Ct. App. 1976)) (“[T]he Civil Rules are to take 
precedence over any other conflicting laws”)); Graley v. Satayatham, 343 N.E.2d at 832 (“[A]ll 
laws while [sic] are attempted to be adopted thereafter and which are in conflict with the Rules 
shall ‘be of no [further] force or effect’”). None of the cases, therefore, provide analytical 
support for the holding in Rockey.
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promulgated rules: “All laws in conflict with such rules [of practice and procedure] 
shall be of no further force or effect after such rules have taken effect.”161
This text describes a constitutional mandate under which a successfully 
promulgated court rule supersedes certain laws. As described in Art. IV, § 5(B), three 
characteristics identify the kinds of laws that will be superseded—laws that (1) affect 
matters of practice or procedure; (2) conflict with a court rule pertaining to matters of 
practice or procedure; and (3) cease their efficacy after a court-promulgated rule of 
practice or procedure takes effect.162 It is this last characteristic that establishes a 
temporal limitation on supersession.
“Further” modifies “force and effect.” As a modifier, the phrase no further denotes 
no longer; the phrase serves to narrow the laws that might otherwise be superseded. It 
necessarily limits the mandated supersession to only those laws that already have some 
“force or effect” because, in ordinary parlance, only laws already in force and effect 
can be said to, at some point, “be of no further force or effect.” The text of Art. IV, § 
5(B) says nothing about whether the force or effect of laws may be enacted after a rule 
is promulgated, and, thus, says nothing about whether the General Assembly may 
enact them.163
The supersession clause of Art. IV, § 5(B) would read differently if the adjective 
further were not included in the phrase “no further force or effect.” If the sentence said 
all laws “in conflict . . . shall be of no force or effect after such rules have taken effect,” 
it would convey a far broader meaning. Without the temporal implication of further,
the third characteristic of Art. IV, § 5(B)’s mandate would address all laws that conflict 
with a court rule, thereby mandating that they have “no force or effect,” regardless of 
when the laws were enacted. Only by ignoring the temporal limitation in the 
supersession clause can one imagine that Art. IV, § 5(B) addresses whether the 
General Assembly may legislate on a matter of practice or procedure after a court rule 
on the matter becomes effective.
That, however, is exactly what the Rockey court imagined. In holding that the 
General Assembly is forever barred from legislating on a matter of practice or 
procedure once a rule on that matter has been promulgated, the court read Art. IV, § 
5(B) as if the adjective further—and the temporal restriction it denotes—were not a 
part of the constitution.164
The exclusive authority over rulemaking, which Rockey established for the court,
had notable consequences. First, by eliminating any further role for the General 
Assembly in writing law that affects practice or procedure, the court set Ohio apart 
from the large majority of other states. On the question of whether rulemaking is 
exclusively within the courts’ domain, over eighty percent of those states reserve, 
either by constitution or statute, at least some authority in the legislatures to author 
content in the rules of governing practice and procedure in their courts.165
Second, when the General Assembly lost its ability to legislate on matters affecting 
rules of practice and procedure, the only remaining check on the court’s authority over 
                                                          
161 Rockey, 611 N.E.2d at 792.
162 See OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 5(B).
163 Id.
164 Rockey, 611 N.E.2d at 791–92.
165 See infra notes 219–23 and accompanying text.
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the content of the rules became the limitation clause in Art. IV, § 5(B): rules of practice 
and procedure may “not abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive right.”166 That 
limitation is juxtaposed in Art. IV, § 5(B) against the court’s authority over 
rulemaking.167 This clause, juxtaposed against the authority granted to the court, is the 
source of the competing and enduring claims between the legislature’s constitutionally 
exclusive authority over substantive matters and the court’s dominion over practice 
and procedure, which according to Rockey is also exclusive.168
The court’s reading of Art. IV, § 5(B)—in a way that made the constitutional 
allocation of lawmaking authority turn on the substance/procedure distinction—
reflects the court’s implicit trust in the distinction. The court trusted that the distinction 
provides a workable standard for deciding whether, when statute and rule conflict, the 
constitutional authority over the matter lies with the General Assembly or with the 
court.169 By the time the court decided Rockey, however, it was broadly accepted that 
the dichotomy cannot bear that weight.170 Scholarly analyses of the distinction had 
already rejected substance/procedure duality as a meaningful standard in the 
rulemaking context.171 The court’s faith was also plainly at odds with what the United 
States Supreme Court had concluded about the same distinction used in the federal 
Rules Enabling Act.172
Nevertheless, acting on its discredited faith in the functionality of a false 
dichotomy, the court created a unique role for itself in Ohio’s system of lawmaking. 
The exclusivity that it found under Art. IV, § 5(B) allowed the court to operate in near-
perfect autonomy to promulgate law without any offsetting balance from another 
branch of government and with only the most flimsy and fleeting check—the 
concurrent resolution of disapproval—on its power. According to Rockey, Art. IV, § 
5(B) transferred to the court the sole authority to make positive law on matters of 
practice and procedure and, yet, left to the court alone the authority to decide whether 
its exercise of that authority was constitutional, i.e., truly a matter of “practice or 
procedure” and not the abridgment, expansion, or modifying of “a substantive 
right.”173 As Alexander Hamilton observed in the Federalist papers, this joinder of the 
legislative and judicial functions in a single branch of government is a prescription for 
“arbitrary control.”174
                                                          
166 Rockey, 611 N.E.2d at 791–92.
167 OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 5(B).
168 Rockey, 611 N.E.2d at 791–92.
169 Id.
170 Burbank, supra note 29, at 1136.
171 Id.
172 Id.
173 Rockey, 611 N.E.2d at 791–92.
174 THE FEDERALIST NO. 47 (Alexander Hamilton) (quoting Charles-Louis de Secondat, 
Baron de La Brède et de Montesquieu) (“Were the power of judging joined with the legislative, 
the life and liberty of the subject would be exposed to arbitrary control, for the judge would then 
be the legislator.”) (emphasis added); THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (Alexander Hamilton) (“If men 
were angels, no government would be necessary . . . . In framing a government which is to be 
administered by men over men, a great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the 
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D. The Lovelady/Havel Line of Cases
The other, comparably seminal, cases began with State ex rel. Loyd v. Lovelady,175
which the Supreme Court of Ohio decided in 2006. There, the issue was similar to that 
in Rockey: an apparent conflict between a civil rule and a subsequently enacted 
statute.176 Civil Rule 60(B) allowed only a limited amount of time for a party to seek 
relief from the judgment because of newly discovered evidence.177 The statute, 
however, allowed a longer period in that particular kind of case.178
The court held—this time, attempting some textual analysis—that the statute 
prevailed over the rule because the statute was “substantive.”179 Despite repeating that 
Art. IV, § 5(B) gave the court “the exclusive authority”—a phrase that does not appear 
in Art. IV, § 5(B)—over matters of practice and procedure, the court ruled that the 
General Assembly may nevertheless legislate on matters of practice and procedure.180
The court stated: 
Section 5(B), Article IV of the Ohio Constitution states that the Supreme 
Court is vested with exclusive authority to “prescribe rules governing 
practice and procedure . . . .” If the legislature intended the enactment to be 
substantive, then no intrusion on this court’s exclusive authority over 
procedural matters has occurred.181
This, of course, is a novel definition of the substantive/procedure dualism. It makes 
the distinction turn, not on the meaning of the words substantive and procedure
themselves, but on whether the legislature intended that the procedural matter 
addressed in the statute should become “a substantive right.” Before reaching for this 
novel definition, the court did not consider whether Art. IV, § 5(B), because it refers 
to the concept of “a substantive right,” might be read to imply the existence of the 
contradistinctive concept, “a procedural right.”182 After all, the plain language of the 
Amendment limits the court’s authority to promulgate procedural rules only to the 
extent that they interfere with, not all rights, but only “substantive” rights.183 Instead 
of parsing out the significance of the adjective substantive modifying right, the court 
                                                          
government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself. . . . 
[E]xperience has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions).
175 State ex rel. Loyd v. Lovelady, 840 N.E.2d 1062 (Ohio 2006).
176 Id. at 1063.
177 Id. at 1064.
178 Id.
179 Id. at 1064–65.
180 Id. at 1064.
181 Id. (emphasis added).
182 Id. at 1063.
183 Id.
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said that “a statute may create a substantive right despite being ‘packaged in 
procedural wrapping.’”184
In determining whether the General Assembly intended to create a right that 
supersedes a procedural rule, the court in Lovelady accepted a declaration that the 
legislature included in the preamble accompanying the original legislation.185 The 
court took that declaration as establishing the legislative intent that disposes of the 
constitutional question. The court said:
Fortunately, we have a clear and unambiguous statement from the General 
Assembly that is directly on point. . . . [The House Bill] . . . provided that 
“[t]he General Assembly hereby declares that it is a 
person’s . . . substantive right to obtain relief from a final judgment, court 
order, or administrative determination or order that . . . requires the 
person . . . to pay child support for a child.”. . . Thus, although [the statute
is] . . . necessarily packaged in procedural wrapping, it is clear to us that 
the General Assembly intended to create a substantive right to address 
potential injustice.186
The court decided Lovelady several years after it changed the rules for ranking the
precedential value of its decisions.187 Before 2002, it was the court’s syllabus, not the 
signed opinion, that stated definitively the points of law established in the case.188 Yet, 
in holding that the statute prevailed over the court-promulgated rule, the court in 
Lovelady did not overrule syllabus 2 of Rockey, which held that the “Ohio Rules of 
Civil Procedure . . . must control over subsequently enacted inconsistent statutes 
purporting to govern procedural matters.”189
Even though Lovelady repeats, without citation, Rockey’s holding that “practice 
and procedure” are the court’s exclusive domain, the reasoning in Lovelady
nevertheless contradicts the holding in Rockey. Rockey stands for the proposition that 
once the court promulgates a rule on a procedural matter, the General Assembly is 
disenfranchised regarding that matter.190 Lovelady, however, stands for the proposition 
that the General Assembly may legislate on matters of practice and procedure if, in 
doing so, the legislature intends to create a “substantive” right regarding the 
procedural matter.191
                                                          
184 Havel v. Villa St. Joseph, 963 N.E.2d 1270, 1277–78 (Ohio 2012) (quoting Lovelady,
840 N.E.2d at 1064–65).
185 Lovelady, 840 N.E.2d at 1064–65.
186 Id.
187 See SUPREME COURT OF OHIO, SUPREME COURT RULES FOR THE REPORTING OF OPINIONS 
§ 2.0, Rule 1(B) (2012).
188 Id.
189 Rockey v. 84 Lumber Co., 611 N.E.2d 789, 791–92 (Ohio 1993).
190 Id.
191 Lovelady, 840 N.E.2d at 1064–65.
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The court’s 2012 decision in Havel v. Villa St. Joseph192 may be slightly more 
important than Lovelady—if only because the court attempted to lay a firmer 
foundation for its holding in Lovelady. The Havel decision provided a different 
rationale for Lovelady’s holding that the General Assembly may override a court-
promulgated procedural rule if it enacts a statute converting the procedural matter into 
a procedural right.193 Once again, the court attempted to achieve that end without 
overruling Rockey’s syllabus 2.194 The rationale the court adopted in Havel is even 
more novel than Lovelady’s.
In Havel, the issue was similar to those in both Rockey and Lovelady. A court rule 
conflicted with a subsequently enacted statute.195 Civil Rule 42(B) gave the trial court 
discretion whether to bifurcate the trial of a claim for punitive damages from the trial 
of the underlying liability.196 The statute, however, made bifurcation mandatory upon 
the request of any party.197
Although the General Assembly had not declared explicitly (as had happened in 
Lovelady) an intention to create a substantive right, the court in Havel nevertheless 
held that the statute was substantive.198 The court gave three reasons. The first is 
pivotal. The court attempted there to explain why the term “substantive right” 
encompasses “rules governing . . . procedure.”199 The court ultimately said that every 
right created by statute is, by definition, a “substantive right.”
The court’s reasoning began with a commonly cited definition of substantive. In 
the two pivotal paragraphs of the decision, the court said: 
[A] statute’s constitutionality depends upon whether it is a substantive or 
procedural law. In Krause v. State, . . . we defined “substantive” in the
context of the constitutional amendment to mean “that body of law which 
creates, defines and regulates the rights of the parties. * * * The word 
substantive refers to common law, statutory and constitutionally recognized 
rights.” . . . By contrast, procedural law “prescribes methods of 
enforcement of rights or obtaining redress.”
A right is defined as “[a] power, privilege, or immunity secured to a person 
by law,” as well as “[a] legally enforceable claim that another will do or 
will not do a given act.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1436 (9th Ed. 2009). 
Compare R.C. 2505.02(A)(1) (defining a “substantial right” for the purpose 
of defining a final order as a “right that the United States Constitution, the 
Ohio Constitution, a statute, the common law, or a rule of procedure entitles 
a person to enforce or protect”). Thus, classification of R.C. 2315.21(B) as 
                                                          
192 Havel v. Villa St. Joseph, 963 N.E.2d 1270 (Ohio 2012).
193 Id. at 1277–78.
194 Id.
195 Id. at 1272.
196 Id.
197 Id.
198 Id.
199 Id. at 1278.
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a substantive or procedural law depends upon whether the statute creates 
a right.200
Notice how in the brief span of this passage a “substantive right,” which begins as a 
concept distinct from matters procedural, sheds the adjective substantive and, then, 
becomes any right that is created by statute, even one that might pertain to procedural
law.
To rationalize this transformation, the court relied on a fallacious equivocation. In 
construing the phrase “substantive right” as used in Art. IV, § 5(B), the court resorted 
to a statutory definition for the term substantial right—a phrase that does not appear 
in Art. IV, § 5(B).201 Next, the court demonstrated that the term substantial right, as 
used elsewhere in Ohio law, encompasses procedural matters.202 Then, without 
explaining the relationship, if any, between substantive rights and substantial rights, 
the court used the definition of substantial right to explicate the meaning of 
“substantive right,” finding that as used in Art. IV, § 5(B) the term “a substantive 
right” subsumes procedural matters.203 The court’s conflating of substantive with 
substantial as equivalents violates the plain meaning of the two words.204
Nothing in the plain language of Art. IV § 5(B) and nothing in the court’s prior 
opinions suggests that Art. IV, § 5(B) uses the term “a substantive right” in a sense 
that makes procedural matters merely a subset of substantive rights.205 Instead, the 
Supreme Court of Ohio made precisely the opposite point in Krause v. State, the first 
case in which the court was required to interpret the Modern Courts Amendment.206
The court said that “[t]he word ‘substantive,’ as used in Section 5(B) of Article IV, 
contradicts the words ‘adjective’ or ‘procedural’ . . . .”207 In other words, the terms 
substantive and procedure, as used in Art. IV, § 5(B), are distinct. They are juxtaposed,
meaning that they are set off against each other. One is not a subset of the other. 
Rather, the terms “substantive” and “procedure” are used in their usual and 
customary—but nonetheless irremediably vague—senses as antonyms, not in a sense 
suggesting that one is subordinated to the other. This is precisely the binary, bright-
line sense in which the Rockey court understood “substantive right.”208
                                                          
200 Id. at 1275 (emphasis added).
201 Id.
202 Id.
203 Id. at 1279.
204 See BRYAN A. GARNER GARNER’S MODERN ENGLISH USAGE 873 (4th ed. 2016) 
(“substantive . . . B. For substantial. . . .  Substantive is more specialized [than substantial], 
appearing most often . . . in law (in which it serves as the adjective corresponding to substantive 
and as the antonym of procedural <substantial rights>). Some writers misuse substantive for 
substantial . . . .”). According to Garner, this misuse is to be rejected as nonstandard American 
usage. Id. (“LANGUAGE-USAGE INDEX substantive misused for substantial: Stage 1 . . .
Rejected.”).
205 See OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 5(B).
206 See Krause v. State, 285 N.E.2d 736 (Ohio 1972).
207 Id. at 744.
208 Rockey v. 84 Lumber Co., 611 N.E.2d 789, 789 (Ohio 1993).
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A close reading of Art. IV, § 5(B) confirms the antithetical relationship. In the 
phrase “substantive right, the adjective substantive qualifies and limits the noun right.
That qualification indicates that not all rights are beyond the court’s power to “abridge, 
enlarge, or modify”; only “substantive” rights are off limits for the court’s 
rulemaking.209 The presence of this qualification suggests that Art. IV, § 5(B) 
implicitly recognizes the existence of a class of rights distinct from substantive rights. 
Because in legal parlance procedural is the most natural antonym of substantive, the 
probable meaning is that procedural rights are within the court’s power to “abridge, 
enlarge, or modify.”210 If Art. IV, § 5(B) does indeed imply for its limited purposes 
the existence of procedural rights, a court-promulgated rule establishing a procedural 
right would not offend Art. IV, § 5(B) and might, therefore, be enforceable.
It is not surprising that Art. IV, § 5(B) would rely on the existence of the concept 
of procedural right that is contradistinct from a substantive right. The individuals who 
proposed the Modern Courts Amendment had full confidence that the 
substance/procedure dichotomy was an adequately functional analytic device for 
dividing judicial and legislative domains.211
All that said, a court-promulgated rule establishing a procedural right would, of 
course, be enforceable only if the rule were in fact procedural, not substantive.212 So, 
even a more nuanced reading of Art. IV, § 5(B) that preserves the antithetical 
denotation of the terms substance and procedure does not—and cannot—avoid the 
inevitable unworkability of the substance/procedure dualism.
Havel’s failure as a persuasive explication of Art. IV, § 5(B) stems from the court’s
ignoring that procedure and substance, as the terms are used in Art. IV, § 5(B), are 
juxtaposed in their usual and customary senses as antonyms, not in a sense that makes 
one a subset of the other. In the end, Havel leaves unanswered the same central 
question that Rockey left unanswered: How does a procedural matter differ from a 
substantive matter?213 Simply no principled answer to that question exists. The context
of Art. IV, § 5(B) can no more plausibly support the equivocation the court attempted 
in Havel than it can plausibly support the attempt in Rockey to read the temporal 
limitation in the supersession clause out of the Amendment.
One final statement must be made about the rule announced in Lovelady and Havel.
Despite the absence of a textual foundation, the rule announced in Lovelady and Havel
recognizing shared rulemaking authority.214 In doing so, those cases placed Ohio into 
the majority of states on that issue. Of the other forty-nine states, forty preserve for 
state legislatures the entire, or at least some, authority in forming the content of court 
rules.215 Of these, seventeen states preserve authority the same way the federal system 
                                                          
209 OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 5(B).
210 Rockey, 611 N.E.2d at 791–92.
211 Cf. Milligan & Pohlman, supra note 54, at 832 (noting that Art. IV, § 5(B) “itself states 
that the ‘rules shall not abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive right. . . .’ [Although grey 
areas may exist,] this provides a limit to the scope of the rule-making authority. . . .”).
212 Rockey, 611 N.E.2d at 791–92.
213 Havel v. Villa St. Joseph, 963 N.E.2d 1270 (Ohio 2012).
214 Id. at 1272; State ex rel. Loyd v. Lovelady, 840 N.E.2d 1062, 1064–65 (Ohio 2006).
215 See infra note 217 and accompanying text.
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does, by legislative delegation of constitutional authority to the court.216 Analytically, 
therefore, these seventeen delegating legislatures have available to them the same 
variety of options as those open to Congress.
Delegation is not, of course, the only way states maintain shared authority over the 
content of court rules. Of the remaining twenty-three states, twenty explicitly 
guarantee a say for the legislature in forming the content of rules.217 Of these twenty
states, ten do so by allowing the legislature to change or annul court rules after they 
become effective,218 six by prohibiting the court from promulgating rules that conflict 
with a statute,219 three simply by ordaining only the legislature to prescribe matters of 
                                                          
216 E.g., N.C. CONST. art. IV, § 13(2) (stating the legislature may delegate to supreme court 
the authority to make rules for trial courts); WYO. CONST. art. V, § 2 (stating the court has 
“superintending control over all inferior courts, under such rules and regulations as may be 
prescribed by law”); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 51-14 (2017) (delegating rulemaking authority to 
court by statute); GA. CODE ANN. § 15-2-18 (2017) (delegating rulemaking authority by statute); 
IDAHO CODE § 1-213 (2017) (delegating rulemaking authority to court by statute); 735 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 5 / 1-104 (2017) (delegating rulemaking authority to court by statute); ME. STAT.
tit. 4, §§ 8, 9A (2017) (delegating rulemaking by statute); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 30A, § 16 
(2017) (delegating rulemaking authority to court by statute); MINN. STAT. § 480.051 (2017) 
(delegating rulemaking authority to court by statute); MISS. CODE ANN. § 9-3-61 (2017) 
(delegating rulemaking authority to court by statute); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-1-1 (2017) 
(delegating rulemaking authority to court by statute); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 27-02-08, 27-02-10 
(2017) (delegating rulemaking authority to court by statute); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 1.002(1)(a), 
1.735 (2017) (delegating rulemaking authority to court by statute with legislative power to 
override); 8 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 8-6-2 (2017) (delegating rulemaking authority to court by 
statute); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 16-3-401, 408 (2017) (delegating rulemaking authority to court 
by statute); WASH. REV. CODE § 2.04.109 (2017) (delegating rulemaking authority to court by 
statute); WIS. STAT. § 751.12(4) (2017) (delegating rulemaking authority to court by statute); 
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 5-2-113 (2017) (delegating rulemaking authority to court by statute); cf. 
Petersen v. State, 594 P.2d 978 (Wyo. 1979).
217 See infra notes 219–23 and accompanying text.
218 E.g., ALA. CONST. amend. 328, § 6.11 (1973) (stating rules of practice and procedure 
promulgated by the supreme court “may be changed by a general act of statewide application”); 
ALASKA CONST. art. IV, § 15 (stating rules of practice and procedure promulgated by the 
supreme court “may be changed by the legislature by two-thirds vote of the members elected to 
each house”); FLA. CONST. art. V, § 2(a) (“Rules of court may be repealed by general law 
enacted by two-thirds vote of the membership of each house of the legislature.”); MD. CONST.
art. IV, § 18 (stating court rules are law “until rescinded, changed or modified . . . by law”); 
MO. CONST. art. V5, § 5 (“Any rule may be annulled or amended in whole or in part by a law 
limited to the purpose.”); N.J. CONST. art. VI, §§ 2, 3 (1947) (“The Supreme Court shall make 
rules governing the administration of all courts in the State and, subject to the law, the practice 
and procedure in all such courts.”); S.C. CONST. art. V, § 4 (“Subject to the statutory law, the 
Supreme Court shall make rules governing the practice and procedure in all such courts.”); S.D. 
CONST. art. V, § 12 (“The Supreme Court shall have general superintending powers over all 
courts and may make rules of practice and procedure and rules governing . . . all courts. . . . 
These rules may be changed by the Legislature.”); UTAH CONST. art. VIII, § 4 (stating the 
legislature may amend court rule “upon a vote of two-thirds of all members of both houses of 
the Legislature”); VT. CONST. § 37 (“Any rule adopted by the Supreme Court may be revised 
by the General Assembly.”).
219 E.g., LA. CONST. art. V, § 5 (stating the court may “may establish procedural . . . rules 
not in conflict with law”); NEB. CONST. art. V, § 25 (“[T]he supreme court may promulgate rules 
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practice or procedure,220 and one by leaving it to the legislature to restrict court 
rulemaking as it sees fit.221 The remaining three preserve legislative involvement, but 
do so in idiosyncratic ways or by preserving only limited authority.222
VII. OUR PROPOSAL AND HOW IT WOULD RESOLVE THE PROBLEM IN ART. IV, §
5(B)
The difference between Rockey and the Lovelady/Havel line of cases is enormous. 
Under Rockey, once the court promulgates a rule pertaining to a matter of procedure, 
the General Assembly loses all authority thereafter to legislate in conflict with that 
rule.223 Under Lovelady/Havel, however, both the court and the General Assembly 
have roles in prescribing the content of rules of practice for Ohio courts.224 Although 
the difference between holdings in Rockey and in Lovelady/Havel could not be more 
starkly contradictory, both lines remain authoritative decisions of the Supreme Court 
of Ohio.
Although the court has not yet explained why it hesitates to overrule or modify 
Rockey’s syllabus 2,225 it may now recognize that Rockey’s disenfranchisement of the 
General Assembly is an unworkable, if not indefensible, concept. The exclusivity over 
rulemaking that the court announced for itself in Rockey simply cannot be supported 
by a textual analysis of Art. IV, § 5(B). But neither can the interpretation of Art. IV, § 
                                                          
. . . not in conflict with laws governing such matters”); TEX. CONST. art. V, § 31(b) (stating the 
supreme court shall “promulgate rules of administration not inconsistent with the laws of the 
state”); VA. CONST. art. VI, § 5 (stating court “rules shall not be in conflict with the general law 
as the same shall, from time to time, be established by the General Assembly.”); NEV. REV.
STAT. § 2.120(1) (2017) (“The Supreme Court may make rules not inconsistent with the . . .
laws of the State for . . . the government of the district courts”); N.Y. JUD. LAW § 51 (McKinney 
2017) (stating the court may adopt rules “not inconsistent with . . . statutes of the state”).
220 E.g., CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 6 (stating rules of practice and procedure are statutory; the 
court may annually recommend rules of procedure to legislature); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-201 
(2017) (stating that rules of procedure are statutory); OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1 (2017) (stating 
that civil rules of practice and procedure are statutory); OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 1 (2017) (stating 
that criminal rules of practice and procedure are statutory).
221 E.g., IOWA CONST. art. V, § 4 (stating that the court’s authority is exercised “under such 
restrictions as the General Assembly may, by law, prescribe”).
222 E.g., PA. CONST. art. V, § 10 (stating that the court has authority to prescribe rules, but 
with narrowly limited authority reserved to the legislature); IND. CODE § 34-8-2-1 (2017) 
(“[T]he power of the supreme court to adopt, amend, and rescind rules of court does not preclude 
the creation, by statute, of alternatives to the change of venue”); Foster v. Overstreet, 905 
S.W.2d 504, 507 (Ky. 1995) (holding that the court has exclusive rulemaking authority but 
when a rule conflicted with statute, the supreme court “extends comity to the legislature and 
upholds the statute”).
223 Rockey v. 84 Lumber Co., 611 N.E.2d 789, 791–92 (Ohio 1993).
224 See, e.g., State ex rel. Loyd v. Lovelady, 840 N.E.2d 1062 (Ohio 2006).
225 The court’s decisions in Lovelady/Havel did not overrule or modify Rockey’s syllabus 2 
by implication. In Lovelady, the court cited Rockey with approval for the proposition that the 
court’s constitutional authority over matters of “practice and procedure” is “exclusive.” Indeed, 
for a discussion of whether the court currently may have designs on reviving the rule in Rockey,
see discussion infra Section VIII.
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5(B) that Lovelady and Havel advanced. Neither Rockey nor the Lovelady/Havel line 
of cases rests on a close textual analysis of the Modern Courts Amendment.226
The court can hardly to be faulted, of course, for failing to discover persuasive 
guidance in the current language of the Amendment. The allocation of lawmaking 
authority in Art. IV, § 5(B) turns on the false dichotomy between substance and 
procedure. Ohio does not have available to it the same detour that the United States 
Supreme Court found in Hanna and Burlington Northern for sidestepping the 
substance/procedure enigma.227
The cause of Ohio’s unique futility lies in the very structure of Art. IV, § 5(B). The 
present text can never support an unassailable, judicially created patch over the void 
that exists in it. At present, Art. IV, § 5(B) states only,
? that the supreme court has authority to promulgate rules of practice and 
procedure;
? that “a substantive right” is something different in kind from a matter of 
practice or procedure and something that a court-promulgated rule may 
not alter; and 
? that every statute that is in effect at the time a court rule is duly 
promulgated is superseded if the statute conflicts with the rule.228
None of these propositions, either individually or in sum, provides a premise from 
which to deduce that the General Assembly has or does not have the authority to 
legislate after the court promulgates a rule. The void in Art. IV, § 5(B) similarly is 
unanswerable through the common-law process of interpretation and construction.229
Only momentary reflection on Lovelady and Havel, the court’s current reading of 
Art. IV, § 5(B), reveals that in those cases the court envisions a constitutional 
allocation in which the General Assembly has a role that resembles the shared 
authority in rulemaking that exists under the federal Rules Enabling Act.230 The 
proposed amendment would resolve the conflicting rulings in Rockey and 
Lovelady/Havel by amending Art. IV, § 5(B) to reflect shared rulemaking authority 
that the court itself first recognized in Lovelady and later reaffirmed in Havel.
To repeat, it is rarely wise to pursue a constitutional amendment simply to resolve 
inconsistent rulings from the court. But in the instance of Art. IV, § 5(B), the cause of 
the inconsistency—and, thus, of the danger that shifting majorities will adopt 
conflicting interpretations of Art. IV, § 5(B)—lies in the constitution itself. The flaw 
is in the void in the Modern Courts Amendment on the issue that neither Rockey nor 
Lovelady/Havel could fill.
                                                          
226 See Havel v. Villa St. Joseph, 963 N.E.2d 1270 (Ohio 2012); Lovelady, 840 N.E.2d 1062;
Rockey, 611 N.E.2d 789.
227 Burlington Northern v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 6 (1987); Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 
473 (1965).
228 OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 5(B).
229 See id.; see also sources cited supra notes 23–24.
230 See 28 U.S.C. § 2071 (2017); Havel, 963 N.E.2d at 1270; Lovelady, 840 N.E.2d at 1062; 
Rockey, 611 N.E.2d at 789.
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The proposal this Article advances avoids trying to resolve the hopelessly vague 
substance/procedure distinction. Rather, the proposal addresses directly the void in 
Art. IV, § 5(B) regarding where rulemaking authority resides after a duly promulgated 
court rule takes effect and after, therefore, existing laws in conflict with the rule are 
deemed repealed. 
The proposal accepts the allocation of lawmaking authority that was recognized in 
Lovelady/Havel, making that allocation explicit in the constitution in order to provide 
textual support for a conclusion that—as both the Rockey and Lovelady/Havel lines of 
cases amply demonstrate—the present text cannot provide.231
Specifically, the proposal does through interlineation what the Rockey and 
Lovelady/Havel were unable to do through interpretation. The proposal would add the
following language: 
(B) . . . . The general assembly may change rules promulgated hereunder 
by introducing a bill (1) that states specifically in its preamble that it is the 
legislature’s purpose to create a substantive right and (2) that is enacted into 
law as provided in Article II, Section 16.
This recognition of shared rulemaking authority would immediately mitigate the 
perpetual uncertainty about the proper rulemaking domains for the legislature and the 
court. Coincidentally, the proposed language embodies the approach taken in those 
ten states that expressly allow their legislatures to change or annul court rules after 
they become effective.232
Note, finally, that the proposed language distinguishes between a bill and an act. 
The distinction would make clear that the declared General Assembly’s intent to 
change an existing rule of practice or procedure need not be stated in the enactment 
itself; instead, the declaration may appear in the act’s preamble—as was the case in 
Lovelady.233 The proposal is more specific, however, regarding the General 
Assembly’s declaration than what Havel might permit. In that case, the court found a 
committee’s “statement of findings and intent,” which appeared in an uncodified 
portion of the bill, to be a sufficient declaration of the General Assembly’s intent.234
The proposal specifies that the purpose must be stated in the preamble, thus excluding 
expressions of individual legislators or committees that might never have been before 
either house.
                                                          
231 See Havel, 963 N.E.2d at 1270; Lovelady, 840 N.E.2d at 1062; Rockey, 611 N.E.2d at 
789.
232 See supra note 219 and accompanying text.
233 Lovelady, 840 N.E.2d at 1064–65.
234 Havel, 963 N.E.2d at 1278 (“The uncodified language of S.B. 80 includes a ‘statement 
of findings and intent’ made by the General Assembly. S.B. 80, Section 3, 150 Ohio Laws, Part 
V, at 8024. In the legislative statement to which the court referred, the General Assembly 
asserted, ‘The current civil litigation system represents a challenge to the economy of the state 
of Ohio,’ and recognized that ‘a fair system of civil justice strikes an essential balance between 
the rights of those who have been legitimately harmed and the rights of those who have been 
unfairly sued.’ Section 3(A)(1) and (2), id. The General Assembly further declared that 
‘[r]eform to the punitive damages law in Ohio [was] urgently needed to restore balance, fairness, 
and predictability to the civil justice system.’ Section 3(A)(4)(a), id. at 8025.”).
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VIII.     HAS THE SUPREME COURT SUGGESTED THAT IT MIGHT OVERRULE LOVELADY
AND HAVEL?
The prospect that the Supreme Court of Ohio may revive Rockey is not idle 
speculation. In fact, the court may currently contemplate overruling Lovelady/Havel.
In 2016, this proposal was presented to the Ohio Constitutional Modernization 
Commission.235 The Commission received two comments opposing the proposed 
amendment.236 The first letter was longer and more fully developed than the second,
was written on the Supreme Court of Ohio’s stationery, and was signed by the court’s 
Administrative Director.237 The letter contained no explicit statement indicating 
whether the director was expressing the court’s view or only his own.238
The letter opposed the proposal because, according to the director, the amendment 
“would significantly alter the current distribution of judicial rulemaking powers 
between the Supreme Court of Ohio and the Ohio General Assembly.”239 The letter 
then presents a wide-ranging and heavily footnoted polemic.240 Yet, the analysis was 
flawed beyond what the trappings of scholarship could salvage.
The director begins, ominously, by mischaracterizing the proposal.241 He contends 
that “the purpose of [the] new language is to clarify the distinction between substantive 
right and procedure.”242 He misconstrues the proposal. The proposed amendment does 
not attempt any clarification of these terms. Clarification is impossible.243 The 
Supreme Court of the United States and scholars alike have accepted for decades the 
                                                          
235 Ohio Constitutional Modernization Comm’n, Minutes of the Judicial Branch & Admin. 
of Justice Comm. Meeting 2 (Jan. 12, 2017), 
http://ocmc.ohio.gov/ocmc//uploads/Judicial%20Branch%20and%20Administration%20of%2
0Justice%20Committee/JBAJ%20-
%20Meeting%20Packet%20Part%20I%20(2017.03.09).pdf.
236 Letter from Michael L. Buenger, Admin. Dir., to Janet Gilligan Abaray, Chair, Judicial 
Branch & Admin. of Justice Comm. (Jan. 10, 2017), reprinted in Ohio Constitutional 
Modernization Comm’n, Minutes of the Judicial Branch & Admin. of Justice Comm. Meeting 
25 (Mar. 9, 2017), 
http://ocmc.ohio.gov/ocmc//uploads/Judicial%20Branch%20and%20Administration%20of%2
0Justice%20Committee/JBAJ%20-
%20Meeting%20Packet%20Part%20I%20(2017.03.09).pdf [hereinafter Buenger Letter]; 
Letter from Ronald Kopp, President, Ohio B. Ass’n, to Janet Gilligan Abaray, Chair, Judicial 
Branch & Admin. of Justice Comm. (Mar. 8, 2017), 
http://www.ocmc.ohio.gov/ocmc//uploads/Judicial%20Branch%20and%20Administration%2
0of%20Justice%20Committee/03.08.2017%20OSBA%20letter%20to%20Chair%20Abaray.p
df [hereinafter Kopp Letter].
237 Buenger Letter, supra note 236, at 25–32; Kopp Letter, supra note 236, at 1.
238 Kopp Letter, supra note 236, at 1–2.
239 Buenger Letter, supra note 236, at 25.
240 See id.
241 Id. at 25–26.
242 Id.
243 Id. at 25.
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futility of relying on the substance/procedure dualism to separate domains of 
rulemaking authority.244
The director takes better aim when he focuses, not on the substance/procedural 
duality, but on allocation of rulemaking authority. Although his aim may be better on 
this issue, the director simply shoots at the wrong target.
The director believes that the authors crafted their proposal for the purpose of 
subverting the status and prerogative that the Supreme Court of Ohio currently enjoys 
in promulgating rules of practice and procedure.245 According to the director:
The proposal could effectively shift procedural rulemaking authority from 
the Supreme Court of Ohio to the Ohio General Assembly. . . . [T]he 
addition of the new sentence would ultimately render that [court’s] power 
superficial at best. Using the moniker of “substantive right,” the General 
Assembly could effect considerable and largely unreviewable changes to 
rules of practice and procedure.246
Of course, the proposal would etch into the constitution a role for the legislature in 
forging the rules that govern procedure in the courts of Ohio.247 But to perceive the 
proposed amendment is the proximate cause for the emergence of a role is to ignore 
Lovelady and Havel.
Ignoring those cases is exactly what the director does— conspicuously. Although 
Lovelady has been the law in Ohio since 2006 and Havel since 2012, the director’s 
argument makes no reference to the holdings in either of those cases—namely that the 
General Assembly may legislate on a matter of procedure if, in doing so, “the General 
Assembly intended to create a substantive right.”248 Nor does his letter suggest that 
that the proposed amendment somehow distorts the holdings in Lovelady or Havel.249
Rather, the supreme court’s administrative director argues against the proposed 
amendment on the unspoken premise that the specific rulings recognizing a role of the 
General Assembly are not already the law of Ohio.250
In the preceding section, the authors have argued that the conflicting holdings in 
Rockey and Lovelady/Havel have given rise to the rare instance where merely 
                                                          
244 Id. at 26.
245 Id. at 25.
246 Id. at 25–26.
247 Id. at 25.
248 State ex rel. Loyd v. Lovelady, 840 N.E.2d 1062, 1064–65 (Ohio 2006).
249 See Buenger Letter, supra note 236, at 25. The leading treatise on the Ohio Constitution 
makes the very same oversight. Discussing the scope of the Supreme Court of Ohio’s 
rulemaking authority under the Modern Courts Amendment, Professors Steinglass and Scarselli 
state that rules promulgated by the Supreme Court of Ohio “cannot be amended or overridden 
by the General Assembly.” Steinglass and Scarselli, supra note 62, at 202. As authority for that 
proposition, they cite “Rockey v. 84 Lumber Co. 1993.” Id. (citing Rockey v. 84 Lumber Co., 
611 N.E.2d 789 (Ohio 1993). In characterizing the supreme court’s rulemaking authority as 
exclusive, they—like the supreme court’s administrative director—take no account of Lovelady,
although it had been decided five years before their treatise’s publication date.
250 Buenger Letter, supra note 236, at 25–26.
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conflicting interpretations warrant amending the constitution. Unless the sharing of 
rulemaking authority—which Lovelady and Havel recognize—is chiseled into the 
constitution, the court may sometime in the future exercise its common-law
prerogative to overrule the authority of those cases. In fact, the director’s letter outlines 
the rubric that the court might use to do away with the holdings in Lovelady and 
Havel.251
According to the director’s argument, state courts differ both constitutionally and 
pragmatically from trial and appellate courts in the federal system.252 He reminds us 
that, although Ohio courts of appeals and common pleas are constitutional creatures, 
allocation of responsibilities between the Congress and the federal judiciary 
is not grounded in constitutional design but is framed by the specific 
language of the Rules Enabling Act and more broadly by Congress’s 
general authority under U.S. Constitution, Article III . . . . All federal courts, 
other than the U.S. Supreme Court, are creations of statute.253
The director gives examples why “[s]tate courts are not mirror images of federal 
courts” because “they can have vastly different and more expansive 
responsibilities.”254 He concludes that the differences run so deep and so wide that 
neither Ohio nor any other state can fruitfully look to the federal system’s model of 
shared rulemaking authority.255
To demonstrate that federal-style delegation does not fit judicial rulemaking for 
state courts, the director offers statistics to demonstrate that most states are like 
Ohio.256 He points out that other state courts, like the Supreme Court of Ohio, exercise 
rulemaking authority by constitutional allocation, not by delegation.257
If statistics are to hold any sway on the question of shared rulemaking authority, 
the relevant statistic is not how many states’ constitutions recognize their courts’ 
rulemaking authority. Rather, the relevant statistic is the number of states that preserve 
a role for the legislature in the rulemaking process, regardless of whether the court 
possesses rulemaking authority by constitutional allocation or statutory delegation. A 
lingering authority in the legislature is, after all, what Lovelady/Havel recognized and 
what the director argues against.258 As demonstrated at the conclusion of section VI,
the facts do not support the director’s argument. Only a distinct minority of Ohio’s 
                                                          
251 See id.
252 Id. at 26.
253 Id.
254 Id. at 29.
255 Id. at 29, 32.
256 Id. at 27.
257 Id. (“Ohio—as most other states—differ [sic] remarkably from the federal model by 
constitutionally vesting rulemaking authority directly in the state judiciary.”). The director 
counts 31 states as doing so. Id.
258 Havel v. Villa St. Joseph, 963 N.E.2d 1270, 1277–78 (Ohio 2012); State ex rel. Loyd v.
Lovelady, 840 N.E.2d 1062, 1064 (Ohio 2006); Buenger Letter, supra note 236, at 25.
39Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2017
108 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66:69
 
sister states—nine259 of forty-nine260—share the director’s view that a state legislature 
should have no role in forming the content of rules for state courts.
Aside from statistics, the centerpiece of the director’s argument against the 
proposal is that Ohio’s principal courts—supreme, appellate, and common pleas—are 
created by the Ohio Constitution, while federal appellate and trial courts are merely 
statutory creatures.261 This distinction between the constitutional versus statutory 
nature of courts, according to the director, amounts to a difference so “subtle but 
important” as to make unthinkable the notion that the Ohio legislature might have 
retained any role that resembles Congress’s role in a rulemaking system.262 This 
argument, however, flatly ignores history in two important ways.
First, Ohio’s principal courts have existed as entities created by the constitution 
since 1802.263 That is to say, since Ohio’s founding, its trial courts and, later, its courts 
of appeals, have been fixtures in the state constitution.264 Over those years, the General 
Assembly repeatedly has enacted laws regulating practice and procedure in those 
courts.265 Never during those 150 years was it thought constitutionally impermissible 
for the General Assembly to write those rules.266 If the legislature has lost the 
constitutional authority that it has exercised since 1802, that change occurred only 
since and because of adoption of the Modern Courts Amendment. More specifically, 
the change would have occurred despite Art. IV, § 5(B)’s silence on the subject of 
whether the legislature has any authority after the court adopts a rule of practice or 
procedure.267 Silence itself is not a mandate for disenfranchisement of an authority that 
                                                          
259 E.g., ARIZ. CONST. art. 6, § 5, cl. 5; ARK. CONST. amend. 80, § 3; COLO. CONST. art. VI, 
§ 21; DEL. CONST. art. IV, § 13; HAW. CONST. art. VI, § 7; MICH. CONST. art. VI, § 5; MONT.
CONST. art. VII, § 2(3); N.H. CONST. pt. 2, art. 73-a; W.V. CONST. art. VIII, § 3.
260 See supra notes 219–23 and accompanying text.
261 Buenger Letter, supra note 236, at 26–28.
262 Id. at 28–29 (“Given the subtle but important differences regarding the role of federal 
and state courts, there is a high need to preserve state judicial authority over a wider range of 
issues affecting the judicial branch if only to ensure access to a judicial forum for the peaceful 
resolution of virtually any dispute. To understand state court rulemaking through the prism of 
federal court rulemaking is to improperly conflate America's dual constitutional system (and by 
extension its dual court system) into a single system of understandings. . . . . That the people of 
Ohio have decided on a different distribution of governing power does not make that distribution 
improper or invalid.”).
263 OHIO CONST. art. III, §§ 2 (supreme court), 3 (common pleas) (1802). The appellate 
courts in Ohio were not created under the constitution until adoption of the Constitution of 1850. 
OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 3; Barbara A. Terzian, Ohio’s Constitutions: An Historical Perspective,
51 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 357, 365 (2004).
264 OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 5(B).
265 See sources cited supra note 3.
266 Id.; see OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 5(B).
267 See OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 5(B).
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has been exercised continually since the state’s founding. In fact, Ohio law has long 
disapproved the implied repeal of constitutional provisions.268
Second and more pointedly, the court’s actions since the Modern Courts 
Amendment was adopted refutes the argument that federal-style sharing is impossible
because Ohio’s court system is deeply and widely different from the federal system.
A survey of the court’s rulemaking activity since it acquired its rulemaking authority 
reveals that the court itself does not see the same radical difference between the Ohio 
and federal systems that its administrator director perceives.269
Look at the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure, the criminal rules, and the rules of 
appellate procedure. Look, too, at the Ohio Rules of Evidence. All were promulgated 
by the Supreme Court of Ohio under authority of Art. IV, § 5(B).270 In each instance,
the court obtained the skeleton and almost all of the flesh for these creatures of Ohio 
law from federal models.271 Look further at the Modern Courts Amendment itself. That 
is the headwater for the court’s rulemaking authority. Again, Ohio looked to a federal
model for the foundation on which to lay the bedrock for Ohio’s entire system of court-
promulgated rules.272 This time, it looked to the federal Rules Enabling Act as it 
existed at that time, and it adopted the federal concepts and structure.273 In fact, Ohio 
followed the federal form more faithfully than all but a handful of other states.274 Ohio 
lifted the three core elements of Art. IV, § 5(B) verbatim from the Rules Enabling Act, 
and it remained silent on the same issues upon which the federal Rules Enabling Act 
was silent.275
The glaring reality is that, for the past half century, Ohio has regarded the federal 
system as its pattern-maker-of-choice on rulemaking matters. The Supreme Court of 
Ohio has not so much as looked at another possible guide during its fifty-year voyage 
down the rulemaking path.276 We have traveled too far down that road for the navigator 
to now suggest that the maps it repeatedly chose to chart this trip were plotted for a 
different continent.
                                                          
268 See, e.g., State ex rel. Hoyt v. Metcalfe, 88 N.E. 738, 741 (Ohio 1909) (“Repeals by 
implication are not favored with respect to statutes, and for a stronger reason they should not be 
favored with respect to constitutional provisions. The repugnancy, to work a repeal, must be 
wholly irreconcilable, as the intention to repeal will not be presumed, nor the effect of the repeal 
admitted unless the inconsistency is unavoidable.”); see also SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 67, 
at 337 (“Repeals by implication are disfavored—very much disfavored. But a provision that 
flatly contradicts an earlier-enacted provision repeals it.”) (internal quotations omitted); see 
generally id. passim.
269 See Rothstein, supra note 91, at 125–73.
270 OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 5(B).
271 Rothstein, supra note 91, at 125–73.
272 See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
273 Id.
274 See supra notes 221–25 and accompanying text.
275 See supra Part II.
276 See Parness & Manthey, supra note 3, at 250–55.
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Of course, the court has modified, to some extent, each of the federal models to 
make them fit Ohio’s needs.277 But, despite the changes, the similarities between the 
Ohio rules and their federal prototypes remain deep and tight. Because those 
similarities endure, the burden was on the director to show that the difference between 
constitutionally and statutorily created courts has somehow influenced the Supreme 
Court of Ohio’s rulemaking activity. Did the court, for example, modify any federal 
prototypes in order to account for the constitutional nature of the Ohio trial and 
appellate courts? One will find that in the Supreme Court of Ohio’s nearly fifty years 
of rulemaking, the court never once cited the constitutional/statutory distinction as the 
reason why any Ohio rule of practice or procedure had to be written differently from 
its federal model.278
The director’s rubric for dismissing shared rulemaking-authority as a workable 
method for Ohio is analytically transparent. More than eighty percent of the other 
states have adopted the opposite view about sharing. That fact alone exposes the 
flimsiness of the director’s argument.279
But the very weaknesses of the argument sparks suspicion. In light of Art. IV, § 
5(B)’s silence280 on the pivotal question that the Rockey and the Lovelady/Havel cases 
tried unsuccessfully to answer, the director’s rubric, albeit thin, may eventually be all 
the Supreme Court of Ohio would demand to overrule Lovelady and Havel. Does a 
public endorsement of the argument from the court’s administrative director portend 
that reversal when, at some point, the question next comes before the court?
IX.    CONCLUSION
Currently, if a statute were to satisfy the two conditions identified in this proposal 
to amend Art. IV, § 5(B), the statute would necessarily satisfy the requirements 
announced in Lovelady/Havel. In other words, the proposal to amend Art. IV, § 5(B) 
would not change the result of any case currently controlled by the rule announced in 
those cases.
                                                          
277 See supra notes 47–49 and accompanying text.
278 There have been many instances, of course, when language in a federal rule was rejected
and rewritten for Ohio. The reasons have been many. On very rare occasion, a rule was revised 
due to constitutional concerns. See, e.g., 1980 Ohio Staff Note, Evid.R. 501, General Rule 
regarding Privileges (“[T]he difficult lines to be drawn between rules of procedure and 
substantive law so frequently encountered in evidence rules are no more clearly demonstrated 
than in the area of privileges. In adopting by reference privilege statutes and common law 
constructions the direct confrontation is avoided [in Ohio Evid.R. 501].”). That Staff Note 
recognizes that a similar difficulty exists also with rules regarding competency of witnesses. 
See id. (“Closely related to the question of privilege is the question of competency of 
witnesses.”). 1980 Ohio Staff Note, Evid.R 601, General Rule Regarding Competency of 
Witnesses explains Ohio Rule 601 had to differ from its federal counterpart because the 
respective rules had to take account, for example, of the fact that the General Assembly and 
Congress had enacted statutes addressing different factors that affect competence of witnesses
These constitutional concerns, however, involved “the lines to be drawn [in Art. IV, § 5(B)] 
between . . . procedure and substantive law.” They did not in any way implicate the difference 
between constitutional and statutory courts.
279 Buenger Letter, supra note 236, at 25–32.
280 See supra note 64 et seq. and accompanying text.
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By making these conditions explicit in the constitution and, therefore, permanent, 
the proposal would guarantee that the Supreme Court of Ohio would never revert to 
Rockey-like interpretation of Art. IV, § 5(B). When the conditions recognized in
Lovelady/Havel are added to the current wording, Art. IV, § 5(B) will finally answer 
the question on which it has heretofore been silent. With the proposed enhancement, 
the amendment will establish a partnership between the court and the legislature on 
matters of practice and procedure and, thereby, prevent the court from ever again 
finding a mutually exclusive allocation of authority between it and the General 
Assembly. What’s more, the proposal would render the false dichotomy between 
substance and procedure constitutionally insignificant. As a result of these effects, the 
court would never again serve both as the sole lawgiver on matters of practice and 
procedure and also as the sole judge of whether the actions it took as lawgiver fit 
within constitutional strictures that restrain the court in exercising its rulemaking 
authority.
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